A Boost and Bounce theory of temporal attention by Olivers, C.N.L. & Meeter, M.
A Boost and Bounce Theory of Temporal Attention
Christian N. L. Olivers and Martijn Meeter
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What is the time course of visual attention? Attentional blink studies have found that the 2nd of 2 targets
is often missed when presented within about 500 ms from the 1st target, resulting in theories about
relatively long-lasting capacity limitations or bottlenecks. Earlier studies, however, reported quite the
opposite finding: Attention is transiently enhanced, rather than reduced, for several hundreds of milli-
seconds after a relevant event. The authors present a general theory, as well as a working computational
model, that integrate these findings. There is no central role for capacity limitations or bottlenecks.
Central is a rapidly responding gating system (or attentional filter) that seeks to enhance relevant and
suppress irrelevant information. When items sufficiently match the target description, they elicit transient
excitatory feedback activity (a “boost” function), meant to provide access to working memory. However,
in the attentional blink task, the distractor after the target is accidentally boosted, resulting in subsequent
strong inhibitory feedback response (a “bounce”), which, in effect, closes the gate to working memory.
The theory explains many findings that are problematic for limited-capacity accounts, including a new
experiment showing that the attentional blink can be postponed.
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One of the brain’s crucial functions is to prioritize relevant over
irrelevant information. It does this by a set of mechanisms we
collectively call selective attention. By its very definition, selective
attention is selective: It is thought that only one or, at most, a few
objects can be processed at a time. The important question then is
how much time is spent on selecting and processing one object or
set of objects before attention is available again for the next
selection. In other words, what are the dynamics of attention?
What is its time course? Or, as others have phrased it, what is the
“attentional dwell time” (Duncan, Ward, & Shapiro, 1994)?
The Answer From the Attentional Blink: Attention Is
Slow and Deals With One Object at a Time
If one is interested in the pure time course of attention (“how
long does it take before one can attend to the next piece of relevant
information”) one needs a paradigm that controls for other factors
that may take time, such as having to switch from one location to
the other, or from one complete task to the other. Probably the
most popular paradigm in this respect is the rapid serial visual
presentation task (RSVP; Lawrence, 1971). For the past 15 years,
the two-targets version of the RSVP task has dominated the
literature. Figure 1a depicts a typical example, in which partici-
pants are asked to report two letters from a stream of digits all
presented at a single location (Chun & Potter, 1995). Participants
have little difficulty reporting the first target (T1). However, as
shown in Figure 1b, report of the second target (T2) suffers
considerably when it is presented within about 500 ms from T1. It
is as if attention blinks for half a second while it is busy processing
T1; hence, the phenomenon has been termed the attentional blink
(Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992).
To our knowledge, all currently active theories of the attentional
blink attribute it to a limited-capacity processing stage, or bottle-
neck, with a relatively late locus in the information-processing
stream. The idea is that T1 temporarily uses up vital mental
resources that are then not available to T2. Figure 1c illustrates this
resource depletion. The prototypical account is Chun and Potter’s
(1995) two-stage theory, but similar proposals were made earlier
by Broadbent and Broadbent (1987) and a little later by Jolicoeur
and colleagues (Jolicoeur, 1998, 1999; Jolicoeur & Dell’Acqua,
1998; Jolicoeur, Tombu, Oriet, & Stevanovski, 2002). According
to two-stage theories, all items in the stream can be processed up
to semantic levels (often referred to as conceptual short-term
memory), but representations are vulnerable. For conscious report
of a target, a second processing stage is required which consoli-
dates the item in short-term memory proper. This consolidation
process is limited to about one item at a time, and, it is important
to note, takes time. Thus, while T1 is being consolidated, T2 must
wait. Waiting takes longer if T1 processing takes longer, for
instance, when T1 is masked by a subsequent distractor. However,
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there is little opportunity for waiting, because a distractor quickly
follows T2, overwrites its vulnerable first-stage representation, and
causes an attentional blink as a result. Thus, distractors play two
important roles in two-stage theories: (a) They render T1 process-
ing more difficult, resulting in longer waiting times and, thus, a
more profound blink; and (b) they interfere with the T2 represen-
tation, such that T2 becomes sensitive to the temporary resource
depletion (Brehaut, Enns, & Di Lollo, 1999; Chun & Potter, 1995;
Giesbrecht & Di Lollo, 1998; Grandison, Ghirardelli, & Egeth,
1997; Seiffert & Di Lollo, 1997). Indeed, it has been shown that a
skeletal version of the paradigm, with just the two targets and their
immediately following distractors, is sufficient to generate an
attentional blink (Ward, Duncan, & Shapiro, 1997).
A similar account has been proposed by Shapiro and Ray-
mond, with their colleagues (Isaak, Shapiro, & Martin, 1999;
Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1995; Shapiro & Raymond, 1994;
Shapiro, Raymond, & Arnell, 1994). According to their inter-
ference theory, T1, T2, and the respective subsequent distractors
are uploaded into visual short-term memory (VSTM). Within
VSTM, these items then compete for conscious report. However,
because VSTM resources are limited, the competition is biased in
favor of those items that entered first, with further biases toward
those items that closely resemble the targets. Thus, T1 and the
distractor immediately following it often win the competition for
retrieval, rather than T1 and T2. Within interference theory, the
attentional blink period corresponds to the time needed for T1 to
win the competition and be transferred to a report stage, so that
VSTM can be cleared for T2. As in two-stage theory then, items
are initially represented in a feeble memory system (conceptual
short-term memory or VSTM) and, at that moment, compete for
limited resources. These resources are primarily assigned to T1
because it appears first. While T1 undergoes further processing, T2
suffers from either masking or competition for selection from
surrounding distractors and is lost (see Shapiro, Arnell, & Ray-
mond, 1997, for a unified model).
The temporary loss of control theory (TLC; Di Lollo, Kawa-
hara, Ghorashi, & Enns, 2005; Kawahara, Kumada, & Di Lollo,
2006) has been presented as an alternative to limited-capacity
accounts. It attributes the attentional blink to a temporary loss of
control over the stimulus input. It assumes that, leading up to T1,
the system is configured as an input filter: It adopts an attentional
set for targets and against distractors. Targets pass the filter into
higher processing stages necessary for consolidation and response
planning, whereas distractors are rejected. An important assump-
tion is that, because targets and distractors are usually arbitrarily
defined, the input filter must be actively maintained by a central
executive process. However, when T1 passes the filter, its consol-
idation also requires the dedication of the central executive. This
means that the central executive can no longer maintain the atten-
tional set, and the input filter becomes vulnerable to stimulus-
driven disruption from distractors. As a consequence, targets are
no longer allowed to enter, and an attentional blink is observed. As
the central executive gradually becomes available again, the cor-
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Figure 1. (A) The prototypical attentional blink task, in which the observer is asked to report the two letter
targets (T1 and T2) embedded in a stream of digit distractors. The lag between the two targets is varied. (B)
Typical performance for T1 and T2 as a function of lag (adapted from “A Two-Stage Model for Multiple
Detection in Rapid Serial Visual Presentation,” M. M. Chun & M. C. Potter, 1995, Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 21, Figure 2, p. 112. Copyright 1995 by the American
Psychological Association. (C) The classic explanation of the attentional blink: T1 processing leads to a
depletion of resources that then cannot be used for T2.
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rect input filter is reinstated, and performance returns to normal. It
is questionable, however, whether TLC indeed manages to avoid
the limited-capacity resource-depletion argument. Notably, it as-
sumes that T1 occupies a central executive for some time, during
the course of which the system is not ready for T2. It appears then
that limited-capacity resources have entered through the back door.
Several computational models have recently been developed
that are based on the above ideas (Bowman & Wyble, 2007;
Battye, 2006; Chartier, Cousineau, & Charbonneau, 2004; De-
haene, Sergent, & Changeux, 2003; Fragopanagos, Kockelkoren,
& Taylor, 2005; Shih, 2008). As we discuss further in the General
Discussion, they all assume either direct competition between T1
and T2 and/or indirect competition via the drainage of some
limited-capacity resource. In summary then, the consensus is that
the attentional blink reflects a relatively long-lasting limitation on
attention after encountering a relevant visual event.
The Answer From Cueing Paradigms: Attention Is Fast
and Can Deal With Multiple Relevant Items Presented in
Rapid Sequence
Other studies have suggested an attentional time course that is
rather opposite to that suggested by the attentional blink. Some of
these are illustrated in Figure 2a. For example, Nakayama and Mack-
eben (1989) asked observers to detect and identify a target in a
cluttered display, followed by a mask. Preceding the target display, a
cue indicated the target position with 100% validity. Note that be-
cause cue, target, and mask always appeared in the same position, this
procedure is not at all unlike RSVP. The results, however, were rather
different: Target-identification performance increased with increasing
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between cue and target display, up
to about 100–200 ms. Beyond this peak in performance, increasing
SOAs resulted in gradually decreasing cueing benefits over the time
course of several hundreds of milliseconds. Figure 2b (top left panel)
shows Nakayama and Mackeben’s findings, whereas Figure 2c illus-
trates the hypothesized steeply rising and slowly decaying underlying
attentional time course function. Nakayama and Mackeben referred to
this temporary enhancement in performance as transient attention and
argued that it is largely automatic, operating at a relatively early level
in visual processing. They distinguished it from a slower, more
sustained attentional component. Similar transient attentional en-
hancement functions have been found or hypothesized by others using
various paradigms, including cued visual search (Kristja´nsson, Mack-
eben, & Nakayama, 2001), classic spatial cueing (Mu¨ller & Rabbitt,
1989), spatial distortion (Suzuki & Cavanagh, 1997), image-
classification techniques (Shimozaki, Chen, Abbey, & Eckstein,
2007), saliency-guided search (Nothdurft, 2002), illusory line motion
(Hikosaka, Miyauchi, & Shimojo, 1993), temporal order judgment
(Scharlau, Ansorge, & Horstmann, 2006), flash-lag effects (Bach-
mann & Oja, 2003), eye-movement measurements (Mackeben &
Nakayama, 1993), and RSVP (Botella, Barriopedro, & Suero, 2001;
Chua, Goh, & Hon, 2001).
A rapid transient attention function was actually proposed ear-
lier by Weichselgartner and Sperling (1987), using a combination
of cueing and RSVP. In some of their experiments, observers
monitored a single stream of digits, waiting for a particular cue
(which was typically an outline square or highlighted digit). The
task was to report the cued digit as well as the digits following it.
They found that the cued digit and the one immediately following
it had a high likelihood of report, as had digits later in the stream
(from 300 ms onward). In between, at about 200 ms, was a brief
dip. Figure 2b (top right panel) shows this pattern of results. Like
Nakayama and Mackeben (1989) did later, Weichselgartner and
Sperling argued for an initial, rapid, and automatic attentional
component that was then followed by a slower, more controlled
component. Weichselgartner and Sperling referred to these
two components as two attentional “glimpses.” The brief dip at
200 ms represented the transition between these two glimpses.
It deserves mentioning that Raymond et al. (1992) argued that
this dip might actually reflect an attentional blink. We agree, but,
as we explain later, if it is an attentional blink, it is not caused by
capacity limitations (nor was this claimed as such by Raymond et
al., 1992). The typical limited-capacity explanation would be that
the cued digit drains attentional resources, at the expense of the
digit presented at 200 ms. However, there are several aspects of
Weichselgartner and Sperling’s (1987) data that go against this
possibility. For one, the dip disappeared when a faint outline
square was used to indicate the first to-be-reported digit, or when
an auditory instead of visual cue was used. This suggests there may
have been some low-level visual interference involved. More
important is the fact that, within the second glimpse, observers
were able to report more than the two targets so typical for the
attentional blink task. For example, observers might report one
digit in their “first glimpse” and then three subsequent digits in
their “second glimpse” without much trouble. Limited-capacity
theories would predict a second attentional blink in the second
glimpse (see, e.g., Chun & Potter, 1995).
Further evidence that attention can really deal with multiple
targets presented in rapid succession comes from Reeves and
Sperling (1986; see also Sperling & Reeves, 1980). In these
experiments, participants were presented with two concurrent
RSVP streams of characters, one on the left of fixation and
containing letters, the other on the right of fixation and containing
digits. The task was to monitor the left stream for a cue to switch
to the other stream (e.g., the letter C) and, as soon as it occurred,
to start collecting digits from the right stream. Streams could run
at various speeds (including those used in typical attentional blink
studies), and by assessing both accuracy and order of report from
the second stream, Reeves and Sperling determined which items in
the second stream had received most attention since the onset
of the cue. Across RSVP speeds, the data showed a remarkably
consistent distribution as a function of time. After an initial delay
(regarded as the time needed to detect the cue and switch to the
second stream), chances of a digit being reported rose quickly and
then deteriorated more slowly, such that most reports came from a
period of 250–600 ms after cue onset. Figure 2b (bottom left
panel) shows performance for one observer for streams running at
9.2 ms/item. The important finding here is that observers had
relatively little trouble reporting multiple targets from this 250–
600-ms period. Any existing attentional blink theory would predict
that the very first digit identified in the second stream would cause
an attentional blink for the following digits. There was no sign of
an attentional blink. On the contrary, according to Sperling and
Reeves (1980, p. 359), “the distribution directly estimates the
moment of maximal attention. . . i.e., the moment of fastest regis-
tration—the moment at which the shutter is fully open.” In Reeves
and Sperling (1986), this performance function was described as
the opening and closing of the attentional gate to short-term
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Figure 2. (A) Illustration of the tasks used by Nakayama and Mackeben (1989; top panel) and Sperling and
colleagues (Reeves and Sperling, 1986; Weichselgartner & Sperling, 1987; bottom panel). All paradigms
resemble a combination of rapid serial visual presentation task (RSVP; Lawrence, 1971) and cueing. In
Nakayama and Mackeben, observers saw a cue, a target, and a display-wide mask. Cue and target always
appeared in the same position. The task was to determine the presence and identity of one of two possible targets.
In Reeves and Sperling, observers monitored one RSVP stream for a cue (“C”) to switch to a second stream, from
which they were required to report the next four digits they saw. In Weichselgartner and Sperling, observers
monitored a single stream for an outline square (or another type of cue), after which they had to switch to
reporting digits from the remainder of the stream. (B) Top left panel: Averaged accuracy data for subject NW
of Nakayama and Mackeben (as estimated from their Figure 8). Top right panel: Average target report accuracy
for participant EW (as estimated from Weichselgartner & Sperling’s Figure 2b). Bottom left panel: Average
target-report accuracy for participant AR in a dual-stream RSVP task running at 9.2 ms/item, after the observer
has switched from the first to the second stream (as estimated from Reeves & Sperling’s Figure 3). (C) Both
transient attentional enhancement and transient attentional gating accounts hypothesize the temporary recruit-
ment of attentional resources after a target has been detected (a gamma distribution that returns in both Reeves
& Sperling and Nakayama & Mackeben, with different assumed delays). Data adapted from “Sustained and
Transient Components of Focal Visual Attention,” K. Nakayama & M. Mackeben, 1989, Vision Research, 29,
Figure 8, p. 1683. Copyright 1989 by Elsevier; from “Attention Gating in Short-Term Visual Memory,” A.
Reeves & G. Sperling, 1986, Psychological Review, 93, Figure 3, p. 184. Copyright 1986 by the American
Psychological Association; from “Dynamics of Automatic and Controlled Visual Attention,” E. Weichselgartner
& G. Sperling, 1987, Science, 238, Figure 2, p. 779. Copyright 1987 by the American Association for the
Advancement of Science.
839BOOST AND BOUNCE
memory and was modeled with a gamma distribution with a
relatively steep rise (within 150 ms after cue detection) and a
relatively slow decay (lasting several hundreds of milliseconds),
just like the function drawn in Figure 2c. Later, Sperling and
Weichselgartner (1995; see also Shih & Sperling, 2002) described
it as a transition function from one attentional episode to the next.
Boost and Bounce Theory
Thus, any theory of temporal attention must deal with a major
paradox: Whereas the attentional blink appears to indicate that the
attentional resources available for perceptual input are reduced
when a relevant event is encountered, the transient attentional-
enhancement results appear to indicate that additional attentional
resources are being recruited. What is more, the time courses of
these two functions are remarkably similar. In fact, we have
plotted the two time course functions in Figures 1c and 2c as
vertical mirror images of each other. None of the current theories
can simultaneously explain both these phenomena, simply because
these theories start from opposite premises: the reduction versus
the recruitment of attentional resources.
Our boost and bounce theory seeks to integrate the two phenomena.
In the present article, we present a new theory within which this
similarity in time course is no coincidence. We call this theory the
boost and bounce theory of temporal attention, after its two crucial but
straightforward functions: Attention boosts the visual input by re-
sponding in an excitatory manner whenever relevant information (a
target) is encountered. It blocks, or bounces, the visual input in an
inhibitory manner whenever irrelevant information (a distractor) is
encountered. The theory claims that performance is eventually deter-
mined by the interaction between these two functions and the stimulus
input. It is important to note that there is no role for capacity limita-
tions or resource depletion in explaining the attentional blink, and its
apparently long time course (in the order of 500 ms) is the result of
underlying microdynamics operating at a much smaller time scale (in
the order of 100 ms).
The theory shares a number of ideas with the TLC account of Di
Lollo et al. (2005)—namely the importance of an input filter and
a crucial role for distractors—but eliminates the necessity to
invoke limited-capacity resources. The theory shares even more
with the temporary suppression account proposed by Raymond et
al. (1992), which, incidentally, was the very first theory of the
attentional blink. According to the temporary suppression account,
T1’s defining property opens an attentional gate to higher systems
so that it can be recognized. However, the post-T1 distractor is also
allowed to enter, potentially leading to a false conjunction with the
target-defining feature and, hence, false identification. The atten-
tional blink occurs because this potential for conjunction errors
calls for a period of suppression (or closing of the gate) to protect
target processing. This then goes at the expense of later targets. For
several reasons, Raymond and colleagues abandoned the suppres-
sion account in favor of a limited-capacity account (Raymond et
al., 1995; Shapiro & Raymond, 1994; Shapiro, Arnell, & Ray-
mond, 1997). First, the inhibition was thought to operate “at a
relatively early stage of processing” (Raymond et al., 1992, p.
854), whereas later evidence clearly suggested that blinked items
reach high levels of processing, including the activation of seman-
tic representations (Anderson, 2005; Chua et al., 2001; Luck,
Vogel, & Shapiro, 1996; Maki, Frigen, & Paulson, 1997; Marois,
Yi, & Chun, 2004; Martens, Wolters, & Van Raamsdonk, 2002;
Potter, Dell’Acqua, Pesciarelli, Job, & Peressotti, 2005; Rolke,
Heil, Streb, & Hennighausen, 2001; Sergent, Baillet, & Dehaene,
2005; Shapiro, Driver, Ward, & Sorensen, 1997; Shapiro, Cald-
well, & Sorensen, 1997; Visser, Merikle, & Di Lollo, 2005; Vogel,
Luck, & Shapiro, 1998). Second, the hypothesis that T1 needs
protection from conjunction errors predicts that if no conjunction
errors are possible (e.g., when targets and distractors are from
different categories, or T1 involves a detection task, rather than an
identification task), there should be no blink. This prediction did
not hold either (Chun & Potter, 1995; Shapiro et al., 1994). Finally,
there appeared to be a logical inconsistency in the idea that the
post-T1 distractor triggered the inhibition: “[I]t is difficult to
envision a mechanism capable of inhibiting a stimulus that itself
caused the suppression” (Raymond et al., 1995, p. 661).
However, in our view, the baby has been thrown out with the
bathwater. The temporary suppression model can be saved if we
drop the assumptions that (a) suppression occurs only early in the
system, (b) suppression is necessary to protect T1, and (c) an item
cannot trigger its own suppression. In a way, then, our work serves
to rehabilitate the temporal suppression account, be it in a different
guise. In what follows, we explain the theory and show how it is
implemented in a computational model. We then demonstrate that
this model simulates a substantial number of studies on transient
attention, as well as the attentional blink. We also show that the
theory generates predictions that distinguish it from limited-
capacity theories. Finally, we discuss the crucial differences with
existing computational versions of those theories.
Stage 1: Sensory Processing
In line with Chun and Potter (1995), and many other attention
theories, our theory assumes two major information-processing
stages, both of which are illustrated in Figure 3. Although we refer
to these as stages, they are not strictly sequential but, rather,
interact. The Appendix describes a computational model in which
these interactions are implemented. The first stage, which we refer
to as sensory processing, consists of the activation of representa-
tions of perceptual features, such as color, shape, and orientation,
but also of high-level representations involving semantic and cat-
egorical information. We assume that these different properties are
represented separately, for example, in different feature maps that
feed into one another and together form a hierarchy from simple to
complex processing (e.g., Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Ungerleider
& Mishkin, 1982; Zeki, 1978). We also assume that these initial
sensory signals spread through the system in a mainly feedforward
manner (e.g., Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000).
In line with physiological evidence, representations are activated
rapidly and relatively strongly at the onset of the stimulus (the initial
visual transient, not to be confused with transient attention here) and
then decay to a more sustained level (when the stimulus remains on)
or resting level (when the stimulus is switched off) of activation (e.g.,
Breitmeyer & Ganz, 1976). Multiple representations can be activated
in parallel, but because of items being presented in the same location
in RSVP, an individual item’s activation is affected by preceding and
succeeding items (following, e.g., Keysers, Xiao, Fo¨ldia´k, & Perrett,
2001; Macknik & Livingstone, 1998; Rolls & Tovee, 1994). The
strength of forward masking effects on an item is assumed to depend
on its similarity to the preceding item, whereas the strength of back-
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ward masking is assumed to depend on the similarity to the following
item. This can be interpreted as masking being, in essence, affected by
stimulus saliency: The more an item differs from its predecessor, the
more salient it is, the less it is masked. Finally, in accordance with
neurophysiology, the signal adapts, so that it is reduced when an item
was already presented recently (e.g., Legge, 1978).
Stage 2: Working Memory
The second component is working memory. Working memory
serves as the global workspace, central executive, or task monitor
in which the rules applying to the task at hand are implemented
and maintained (cf. Baars, 1989; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974;
Bundesen, Habekost, & Kyllingsbæk, 2005; Dehaene, Kerszberg,
& Changeux, 1998; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Lavie, Hirst,
Fockert, & Viding, 2004; E. K. Miller & Cohen, 2001). Within our
theory, this means that systems underlying working memory can
flexibly monitor and maintain information and couple the relevant
input to the relevant response. An item can only be reported when
it enters working memory, because only then can it be linked to a
response. Exactly how this stimulus–response mapping occurs is
an important question and not one we are able to answer here. We
simply assume that after receiving verbal instructions and some
practice trials, the crucial links have been established. (In other
words, we cannot yet fully ban the homunculus, but once he has
wired the controls at the start of the experiment, he dozes off and
plays no further role in our model.) In line with Dehaene et al.
(1998), we envisage that these links are established through feed-
back connections from central working memory neurons to rele-
Figure 3. Diagram of the boost and bounce theory. Stimuli in the rapid serial visual presentation task
(Lawrence, 1971) stream are subject to sensory processing, including activation of color, shape, and semantic
properties. The attentional set required for the task is implemented in the working memory gating system, which
is a combination of excitatory and inhibitory gate neurons maintaining feedback loops that respectively modulate
the target- and distractor-related sensory activity. In this way, they open or close the gate to working memory,
within which incoming information is then linked to reportable (e.g., verbal) representations. When a target
arrives, strong attentional enhancement (i.e., excitatory feedback) is triggered, allowing the target to enter
working memory. The gate remains open as long as relevant information enters. However, in the attentional blink
paradigm, the bulk of the excitatory feedback hits the post-T1 distractor, which then triggers a strong inhibitory
feedback response from the gate neurons in turn. An attentional blink is the consequence.
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vant sensory representations on the one hand and to relevant
response representations (whether overt or covert) on the other. An
item may enter working memory—that is, it is selected—when
sufficient (i.e., above threshold) evidence for its presence has
accumulated during the time it was active in the system. The
strength of this activation depends on (a) the bottom-up activity of
the item, as described in the previous section, and (b) the top-down
attentional modulation of this activity received through the feed-
back connections, as is described next.
Gating
Not only does working memory link relevant stimuli to a re-
sponse but it also prevents irrelevant information from interfering
with behavior by shielding response systems from unfiltered sen-
sory representations (e.g., Engle, Conway, Tuholski, & Schisler,
1995; Fuster, 1997; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Jonides, Smith,
Marshuetz, Koeppe, & Reuter-Lorenz, 1998; Lavie, 2000). In
other words, working memory employs an input filter, or atten-
tional set, for relevant information and against irrelevant informa-
tion. Others have also used the term template matching, but we use
the term gating (following, e.g., Reeves & Sperling, 1986). Gating
occurs through feedback that modulates sensory processing (e.g.,
Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000).
Sets of sensory representations that are important for the task are
enhanced, or boosted, through excitatory feedback, whereas sets of
sensory representations that are irrelevant are tempered, or
bounced, through inhibitory feedback. Of course, the ideas of
enhancing target information and suppressing distractor informa-
tion are not new, and they constitute the mechanisms behind many
a selective attention theory (Bundesen et al., 2005; Houghton,
1994; Lavie, 2000; Wolfe, 1994, to name but a few). We assume
gating to be fuzzy. For reasons of cognitive economy, as well as
flexibility, there is no one-to-one mapping between every single
sensory neuron and a gate neuron (Postle, 2006). Instead, gate
neurons operate on populations of sensory neurons, on relatively
broad classes or categories of representations. For example, gating
may be driven by “letter-like,” “colored,” or perhaps as specific as
“reddish” stimuli but cannot apply only to something like “the
little maroon espresso cup” at the exclusion of all other stimuli. In
this sense, gating is also contingently automatic: Once an atten-
tional set has been implemented (presumably at the start of the
experiment), items that sufficiently match this set automatically
elicit feedback activity, even if they are not targets (Bargh, 1992;
Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992).
The modulation is multiplicative: It needs to interact with stimulus-
based activity (Grossberg, 1995). Furthermore, feedback is issued by
gate neurons that are themselves driven by stimuli that are predefined
as targets or distractors. Enhancement and inhibition through feed-
back thus only really start to take off when a stimulus is present.
Furthermore, we assume that gate neurons respond with an initial
strong burst of activity, after which activity tapers off (e.g., Connors
& Gutnick, 1990; Fuster, Bauer, & Jervey, 1982; Goldman-Rakic,
1995; Tomita, Ohbayashi, Nakahara, Hasegawa, & Miyashita, 1999;
Zipser, Lamme, & Schiller, 1996). Functionally, this corresponds to
the idea that updating (as opposed to maintenance) of working mem-
ory only needs to be transient (Hazy, Frank, & O’Reilly, 2006).
Together with others, then, we assume that attention has a strong
transient component (Nakayama & Mackeben, 1989; Weichselgartner
& Sperling, 1987; see also Bowman & Wyble, 2007, and Fragopana-
gos et al., 2005).
Figure 3 illustrates the boosting and bouncing feedback loops
underlying the gating mechanism. When it is one’s task to report
letters but ignore digits, letter representations receive excitatory
modulation, whereas digit representations are subject to inhibitory
modulation. In both cases, although the relevant links are estab-
lished, a concrete input from either category is necessary to elicit
feedback from a gate neuron. As mentioned, the feedforward
sweep of activity caused by stimulus presentation is assumed to
travel upward through a hierarchy of representations. Similarly,
top-down feedback activity travels in the opposite direction.
Although initially only the alphanumeric identity representations
that trigger the feedback are modulated by either boosting or
bouncing feedback, it is assumed that the feedback activity rapidly
spreads down the hierarchy to underlying layers of representation
that originally fed into the identity representation. At the bottom of
the hierarchy, this includes strong attentional modulation of the
location of the feedback-eliciting item. This means that modulation
is not limited to only the triggering stimulus but also affects
successive items presented at the same location.
The strength of the modulation is affected by the strength of the
sensory evidence. The stronger the evidence for a target or a
distractor, the stronger the respective excitatory or inhibitory feed-
back. For this purpose, within the model, the transient attentional
response is weighted by the sensory evidence accumulated during the
first 15 ms of presentation. The sensory evidence itself is affected by
two factors. First, the current state of attention modulates the strength
of the sensory evidence, as bottom-up and top-down mechanisms
continuously interact: Current excitatory feedback enhances the sen-
sory evidence, whereas inhibitory feedback reduces it. Second, as
explained earlier, the less similar targets and distractors are, the
stronger the relative sensory evidence is (because of reduced masking
and increased salience). This also means that when overall target
salience is very high, the need for active gating is strongly reduced
(although not absent), because the bottom-up activity itself provides
strong evidence for what is a target and what is not. Hence, the
strength of the gating is further weighted by the overall similarity
between targets and distractors within the stream.
Last but not least, the spreading of feedback activity through the
visual system takes time. Within our model, after sufficient activ-
ity has reached the layers of representation defining the target (i.e.,
a target has been detected), it takes 25 ms for it to start reaching the
lowest layers. The peak of the feedback activity is not until another
70 ms have passed, and hence, the bulk of attention does not arrive
until roughly 100 ms after target detection. This delay means that,
in RSVP paradigms, the triggering stimulus may actually already
be gone and replaced by the next stimulus by the time the full
chain of recurrent processing is operational. Thus, although the
goal of modulation by feedback may be to retrieve the precise
identity of a target stimulus, the ensuing feedback may acciden-
tally also, or even predominantly, modulate the trailing stimuli.
Capacity Limitations
There are two capacity limitations in our model:
1. No more than one attentional set (or task set) can be
active at the same time. This entails that a reconfiguration
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of selection settings, or switch, is necessary when there
are multiple tasks, multiple locations, and possibly mul-
tiple modalities involved. New gate neurons need to be
recruited or configured to filter for a different location or
a different kind of stimulus. The exact mechanisms of
such switches are not implemented in the model yet. For
the time being, we assume that gate neurons activate one
another and that this causes a transition from one atten-
tional set to the next. Following Sperling and Weichsel-
gartner (1995), we modeled this as follows: After a
stochastically determined interval, a new set of atten-
tional gates opens, and the old gates close. We chose a
logistically distributed stochastic interval with a mean
that depends on the type of switch. Endogenously cued
switches (including task switches) have a mean switch
time of 200 ms, whereas exogenously cued switches are
assumed to take only 75 ms (Carlson, Hogendoorn, &
Verstraten, 2006; Cheal & Lyon, 1991; Eriksen, 1990;
Jonides, 1981; Luck & Vecera, 2002; Posner, 1980;
Posner & Cohen, 1984; Shulman, Remington, &
McLean, 1979).
2. Working memory storage capacity is limited. The likeli-
hood of stimuli entering working memory is not constant
throughout an RSVP stream: When capacity has been
exhausted by previous items that have entered working
memory, new items cannot enter. Capacity was set at five
items (following the evidence that working memory ca-
pacity is about four to seven items, depending on addi-
tional memory strategies, such as chunking, rehearsal, or
efficient use of additional memory systems, Cowan,
2001; G. A. Miller, 1956).
It is important to note that, within our theory, neither of these
capacity limitations provides an explanation for the attentional blink,
as the attentional blink easily occurs with only two targets, for which
one and the same attentional set applies (e.g., Chun & Potter, 1995).
Explaining Empirical Findings: Transient
Attentional Enhancement
In this and the following section, we describe how boost and
bounce theory explains performance enhancement under some
circumstances but performance deterioration under others. It also
explains many related findings. For each finding, we demonstrate
the viability of our theory through simulations with the computa-
tional model specified in the Appendix. It is important to note that
these simulations were generated with just one set of parameter
values (except for parameters governing similarity between items,
where mentioned). Although this precludes optimizing the fit of
particular individual experiments, we wished to capture the overall
pattern of findings with as few assumptions as possible. The
simulations should therefore be evaluated on the basis of their
qualitative, not quantitative, fit of the data pattern.
Transient Spatial Cueing Effects
A relevant event (usually a target or a valid cue) elicits excitatory
feedback from gate neurons to the sensory neurons activated by the
event. This results in a transient boost of the neuronal signals coding
for this event, including representations of its features and source
location. When the gate neurons are triggered, the enhancement is
initially strong but then decays back to normal levels. This mechanism
explains the results of the cueing study of Nakayama and Mackeben
(1989), in which observers had to detect a target in a cluttered and
masked display. A 100% valid abrupt onset cue indicated the target
position. Performance first rose rapidly with increasing time between
cue and target, but for cue–target intervals greater than about 100 ms,
it slowly decreased again, while remaining above chance levels.
Because in Nakayama and Mackeben’s study, the target and mask
were always in the same position as the cue, the largest part of their
task can be simulated as a straightforward RSVP. However, because
participants did not know where the abrupt onset cue would appear,
we assume that the initial part of processing was dominated by an
exogenously triggered spatial switch necessary to orient to the new
location. Within our model, such a switch takes on average 75 ms.
Figure 4a shows the performance predicted by the model for a target
presentation duration of 33 ms (which is the duration Nakayama and
Mackeben used for most of their participants).1 Because the cue
remained on during target presentation, and the target was presented
within a cluttered array and followed by a strong mask, we assumed
masking to be stronger here (by increasing the similarity by a factor
5) than in the subsequent RSVP paradigms.
Two Glimpses
The idea of a rapid transient attentional enhancement had sur-
faced earlier, in a study by Weichselgartner and Sperling (1987),
who referred to it as the first of two attentional “glimpses.” The
second of the two glimpses was thought to reflect a slower, more
sustained attentional process independent of the first glimpse. In
the crucial condition, observers monitored a single stream of digits
for a digit that was uniquely accompanied by a salient cue (e.g., a
surrounding square or a highlighted numeral). The task was to
report this cued digit, as well as the digits that followed it. The
pattern of performance showed two peaks: There was relatively
good performance for the initial target and often the item presented
immediately after, as well as for items presented after about
300–400 ms (after which performance gradually decreased). Be-
tween these two peaks, performance showed a brief but marked
drop. As shown in Figure 4b, our model reproduces these findings.
However, within our model, the “two glimpses” are not the result
of two independent attentional processes being separated in time
but of the continuous interaction of the boosting and bouncing
gating functions. Note that in Weichselgartner and Sperling’s task,
observers needed to ignore digits until the cue (the surrounding
square) was presented, after which digits were to be reported. This
has two implications in our model: (a) Gate neurons are initially
1 Although the Nakayama and Mackeben task involved a spatial cue, it
is mainly informative about the time course of attention, rather than spatial
selection. This is because the target (and, in a sense, the display-wide
mask) always appeared in the same location as the cue. It is interesting to
note that the time course of transient attention does show remarkable
similarities to that of inhibition of return in more classic spatial cueing
paradigms (Maylor & Hockey, 1985; Posner & Cohen, 1984). Whether or
not transient attention is an important factor in inhibition of return remains
an important question for the future.
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set to filter for the additional feature provided by the cue (the
outline square). This means that, initially, items with cue are
treated as targets and cause enhancement, whereas items without
cue are treated as distractors and cause inhibition. (b) After the
cue, digits are to be treated as targets, and an endogenous shift in
attentional set toward accepting digits is now required. Such an
endogenous task switch takes time. The dynamics of the model are
then as follows: The presentation of the cue results in a boost of the
identity of the simultaneously presented digit, which enters work-
ing memory. Because of inherent delays, the boost reaches its
maximum level when the item after the cued item is presented.
Hence, the identity of the post-cue item often also enters working
memory, despite the fact that, within the initial attentional set, it is
still a distractor. Together, these first items in the target series
constitute the first glimpse. At the same time, the cue also acts as
a signal to initiate the task switch, which takes 200 ms on average
(because it is endogenous). During this period, gate neurons en-
gaged with the first task set have not yet switched off, and the
boosted post-cue item sets off inhibition exactly because it is still
being treated as a distractor. In other words, the attentional gate
closes for the next item, resulting in a dip in performance. Later on,
we see that this inhibition, as set off by the post-target distractor,
plays an important role in explaining the attentional blink. In fact,
the brief performance dip in the Weichselgartner and Sperling
results can be regarded as an attentional blink beginning to develop
(cf. Raymond et al., 1992) but then being rapidly reversed as the
second task is activated. This is because, as time passes, the
attentional set is more and more likely to have switched to one in
which digits without accompanying cues are treated as targets. The
attentional gate reopens, and performance rapidly recovers. Exci-
tatory feedback, although already subsiding, is still active and
catches some of these targets in its tail: A second glimpse is
observed (see Figure 4b). Finally, as working memory fills up with
targets, new items are increasingly unlikely to enter working
memory. The model’s prediction then is that, when task switches
are removed, only a single glimpse should emerge. Indeed, recent
data (Olivers, Van der Stigchel, & Hulleman, 2007; Di Lollo et al.,
2005) appear to support this prediction.
Switching Streams
Figure 4c shows how the model accounts for the item-report
data from observer AR in Reeves and Sperling (1986) for an RSVP
task consisting of two streams running at 9.2 items/s. In this task,
observers were required to switch streams as well as tasks after a
cue in the first stream (the cue itself was not to be reported). The
data show the proportion of correctly reported items for each
temporal position in the second stream, after the cue. Within the
model, the first 200 ms of performance are therefore dominated by
the fact that working memory needs to switch from filtering for
cue-defining properties to filtering for digits in the second stream.
Unlike the Weichselgartner and Sperling (1987) task, in this task,
no first glimpse is observed, because as long as the attentional
switch has not occurred, participants are still attending the first
stream, which does not contain any reportable items. Then, as the
switch to the second stream is completed, the targets start to enter
and fill up working memory. Because there are targets in only the
second stream, only excitatory feedback is operational, and there is
no inhibition. Nevertheless, performance eventually deteriorates
simply because working memory is full.
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Figure 4. Model simulations regarding the attentional enhancement findings
of (A) Nakayama and Mackeben (1989), (B) Weichselgartner and Sperling
(1987), and (C) Reeves and Sperling (1986). In Simulation A, backward
masking of the target was assumed to be stronger (by a factor of 5) than in rapid
serial visual presentation paradigms, as Nakayama and Mackeben used cluttered
target displays with relatively strong, long duration masks. In Simulation B, the cue
(outline square, highlighted numeral) was assumed to be more salient than typical
rapid serial visual presentation items, and its color similarity was therefore reduced
to 0.5. SOA  stimulus onset asynchrony.
844 OLIVERS AND MEETER
Explaining Empirical Findings: The Attentional Blink
We consider the typical attentional blink task of having to report
two letters from a stream of digits, as it involves no spatial or task
switches. Excitatory feedback links are set up for letters, and
inhibitory links for digits, although note again that these categories
are considered to be fuzzy. The stream is running, but T1 has not
been presented yet: Only distractors are encountered, and during
the first few, the system settles in a stable inhibitory state sufficient
to keep them out of working memory. Direct evidence for such a
pre-T1 inhibitory state comes from Dux, Coltheart, and Harris
(2006); Maki and Padmanabhan (1994); Olivers and Watson
(2006); and Sahraie, Milders, and Niedeggen (2001).
Then, after the initial streak of distractors, T1 appears. Sensory
evidence for a target arrives in the neurons coding for targets,
which, in turn, elicits feedback from the gate neurons in working
memory linked to these neurons. The result is a surge of excitatory
recurrent processing, boosting sensory signals for T1 and allowing
T1’s identity to enter working memory. Figure 5 illustrates the
dynamics of attention following T1. The most important aspect of
the model is that, even though T1 benefits, the peak of the boost in
excitatory feedback actually arrives after T1, especially at the
lower layers of the representational hierarchy, which need some
more time before they are reached by the recurrent wave of
activity. At the usual presentation rates of 100 ms/item, this means
that the bulk of attention lands on the post-T1 item.
The attentional blink occurs when this post-T1 item is a distrac-
tor. Because of the delay in excitatory feedback, this distractor
accidentally receives the maximal enhancement intended for T1.
As a consequence, the gate neurons now receive a very strong
signal of the wrong category entering working memory. Because
the gating system has been set up to reject distractors, this strong
signal automatically results in a bounce—a strong inhibitory re-
sponse, which, in effect, closes off working memory from the
RSVP stream. As the inhibition builds up over the course of the
post-T1 distractor’s presentation, the distractor itself still has a
reasonable chance of entering working memory, resulting in sub-
stitution errors when the task allows for such errors to be made (cf.
Isaak et al., 1999). However, just as the boost reaches its maximum
after T1, the bounce reaches its maximum after the post-T1 dis-
tractor. If this next item turns out to be a target, an attentional blink
arises: Because of the strong inhibitory feedback, this target is less
likely to muster sufficient activity in time to make it into working
Figure 5. Simulation of the basic attentional blink paradigm. (A) The model’s performance is shown for T1
(the open marker on the y axis) and for T2 as a function of T1-T2 lag. (B) The model’s dynamics for a T2 at
lag 2 is shown in detail, with (1) the bottom-up sensory signal, (2) the top-down attentional response to the input
(as a combination of both excitatory and inhibitory feedback), and (3) the combined bottom-up and top-down
signal.
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memory. This is the case even though this target itself generates
some net attentional boost (see Figure 5). Over time, as the strong
transient inhibition summoned by the post-T1 distractor gradually
resides, performance gradually improves.
Thus, the attentional blink is completely determined by the
temporal dynamics of excitatory and inhibitory selection mecha-
nisms following T1 and its trailing distractor(s). It is not deter-
mined by the need to process and consolidate T1 within working
memory, nor is it determined by limited working memory capac-
ity. Because the most important factor is the delay in feedback
processing, one prediction is that the attentional blink is mainly
time-based, not item-based (even though it is not entirely time-
based, because distractor items are still necessary to trigger the
inhibition). If, for example, the stream runs at twice the speed,
twice as many items should fall within the blink. This prediction
has recently been confirmed (Bowman & Wyble, 2007; Martens,
Munneke, Smid, & Johnson, 2006; Popple & Levi, 2007; see
Nieuwenhuis, Gilzenrat, Holmes, & Cohen, 2005, for a partial
manipulation), and, as shown in Figure 6, our model reproduces
these findings.
The past decades have generated a wealth of other findings
related to the attentional blink, many of which we now discuss.
Lag-1 Sparing
Probably the most important phenomenon accompanying the at-
tentional blink is lag-1 sparing. Performance for T2 is typically high
when T2 immediately follows T1 (e.g., Chun & Potter, 1995; Ray-
mond et al., 1992; see Figure 1). In fact, at lag 1, T2 performance
often exceeds T1 performance (Chun & Potter, 1995; Di Lollo et al.,
2005; Olivers et al., 2007; Potter, Staub, & O’Conner, 2002). This has
been a troublesome finding for most limited-capacity theories. How
can T2 be spared when only one item can pass through the bottleneck,
or when resource depletion should be maximal? So far, solutions have
been sought in additional hypotheses and psychological constructs
that allow for the two targets to be temporarily processed together
(Chun & Potter, 1995), bound to the same token (Bowman & Wyble,
2007; Chun, 1997b) before a sluggish attentional gate closes (Visser,
Zuvic, Bischof, & Di Lollo, 1999), in a single batch (Jolicoeur et al.,
2002), temporal window (Visser, Bischof, & Di Lollo, 1999), glimpse
(Chua et al., 2001), event representation (Kessler et al., 2005), or
episode (Hommel & Akyu¨rek, 2005). We do not deny the existence
of such temporary attentional processes—in fact, many are very
similar to the temporary enhancement function within our model. The
point here is that within most of these theories, the hypotheses of what
causes lag-1 sparing do not explain the attentional blink itself, and
vice versa. As Visser, Bischof, and Di Lollo (1999) wrote, the atten-
tional blink and lag-1 sparing are treated as independent phenomena:
T1 triggers a relatively long episode of up to 500 ms during which
resources are taken away from the stream, resulting in the blink. At
the same time, T1 also triggers a shorter period of about 200 ms,
during which the lag-1 item is assigned additional resources.
In contrast, our theory provides an integrative explanation of both
the attentional blink and lag-1 sparing, by proposing the T1-induced
attentional boost as the common cause. The post-T1 item is spared
and may even yield better performance than T1 itself, simply because
it arrives in the peak of the attentional boost. Because of the boost’s
set delay, the theory predicts that lag-1 sparing is also largely time
based, rather than item based. In other words, relative sparing should
not be confined to lag 1, as long as the later lags fall near the peak of
the attentional boost. The few studies that have looked at the issue all
suggest that the sparing is indeed essentially time based and spreads
to later lags when the RSVP is speeded up (Bowman & Wyble, 2007;
Martens, Munneke, et al., 2006; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). Again,
Figure 6 shows that this pattern of results is successfully reproduced
by our model.
Apparent Tradeoffs Between T1 and T2
Potter et al. (2002) systematically varied the SOA between T1 and
T2 and found evidence consistent with the idea that T1 and T2 are in
direct competition for resources. At short SOAs (100 ms), T2
performance was better than T1 performance (a result indicative of
sparing), whereas at long SOAs (100 ms), T2 performance was
inferior to T1 performance (as is indicative of an attentional blink; see
also Bachmann & Hommuk, 2005). However, in this study, SOA was
confounded with differential masking effects. The targets were words,
whereas the distractors surrounding the targets were always amper-
sands. Thus, at very short SOAs, T1 was probably much more
effectively masked by the closely following and very similar T2 than
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at long SOAs, when it was followed by a train of dissimilar distrac-
tors, whose representation was probably further weakened because of
their repetition (Kanwisher, 1987). T2, on the other hand, suffers more
from the attentional blink at later lags, when more distractors inter-
vene. Such differential effects emerge from our model, and, as can be
seen in Figure 7, it captures the large part of the apparent tradeoff
between T1 and T2, without the necessity to assume a real tradeoff in
terms of attentional resources (see also Kawahara & Enns, in press).
Spreading the Sparing
We have already mentioned that under sufficiently rapid pre-
sentation rates, sparing can spread to lag 2. But even at standard
presentation rates of around 100 ms/item, sparing is not necessarily
limited to lag 1. Di Lollo et al. (2005), as well as Olivers et al.
(2007), asked participants to identify the targets in sequential
triplets of items, like . . . TDT. . ., and . . . TTT. . . (T denoting a
target, D denoting a distractor; all embedded in a stream of
distractors). Note that the final targets in these triplets are in
exactly the same temporal position relative to the first target, and
a limited-capacity account would thus predict an attentional blink
for both these final targets. Yet performance differed remarkably:
There was a clear blink for the final target in the TDT triplet,
whereas there was no blink for any of the targets in the TTT triplet
(this relative sparing of the third target even occurred when per-
formance was analyzed contingent upon T1 and T2 correct). In
other words, lag-2 sparing occurred. Olivers et al. (2007) showed
that with a total of four targets, sparing spreads even further, to lag
3. Work by Nieuwenstein and Potter (2006) demonstrated that
sparing may spread to five subsequent targets. These results are
highly problematic for resource-depletion theories. They predict
that performance should deteriorate, not improve, with increasing
numbers of targets. Boost and bounce theory, on the other hand,
readily explains these findings: As long as no distractor signal
arises, no inhibition is issued (the gate remains open), allowing for
multiple target sparing.
Figure 8 shows the lag-2 and lag-3 sparing found by Olivers et
al. (2007) and the model’s replication.
Rapid Reversal of the Attentional Blink
Even more problematic for limited-capacity accounts is the
finding that sparing can still occur once a proper attentional blink
has been induced. In other words, the attentional blink can be
rapidly reversed. Olivers et al. (2007; see also Kawahara, Kumada,
& Di Lollo, 2006) presented observers with the sequence . . .
TDTT. . . . As expected, an attentional blink was found for the
second of the three targets. However, the third target was almost
completely spared, even though it was presented in a temporal
position relative to the first target that would normally be severely
“blinked” (as was confirmed using . . . TDDT. . . sequences). Sim-
ilar findings have been reported by Nieuwenstein, Chun, Van der
Lubbe, and Hooge (2005) and Nieuwenstein (2006). Just prior to
T2, they inserted distractors carrying the target-defining property
(referred to as cues, these distractors could, e.g., be red when
targets were also red). Again, substantial sparing occurred.
The reversal of the blink also appears problematic for the TLC
account (Di Lollo et al., 2005). TLC hypothesizes that, during the
attentional blink, the central executive control is occupied by T1,
which leaves the input filter vulnerable to exogenous disruption.
Within its current form, TLC does not allow central control to be
reinstated before T1 processing has finished. Instead, T2 might
cause an exogenous reset of the filter to start accepting targets
again (as is proposed by Kawahara, Kumada, & Di Lollo, 2006),
although it is difficult to see how these targets are recognized as
such when they are not allowed to pass the filter in the first place.
Moreover, Nieuwenstein (2006) reported strong evidence that the
attentional filter is actually fully intact during the attentional blink.
He found that when observers searched for red targets in an RSVP
stream, T2 was relatively spared when it was preceded by a red cue
but was hardly spared when it was preceded by a green cue.
However, when he asked observers to detect both red and green
targets, both red and green cues became effective, regardless of the
actual color of T2 itself. TLC cannot account for this, because
green cues should have exogenously reconfigured the input filter
to accept only green targets, not red targets.
The above results imply that, rather than reflecting the irrevers-
ible T1-induced draining of resources for 500 ms, the attentional
blink reflects the dynamic, relatively rapid, online response to
important changes in the stimulus stream. Given the speed at
which these streams run (typically at 10 items/s), the data suggest
that the system responds on a time scale of something more like
100 ms, rather than 500 ms. Boost and bounce theory readily
allows for such rapid reversals of the attentional blink following
either targets or cues. A particular target (or target-like cue) is
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blinked because the system is still in a strong inhibitory state
following a distractor. Nevertheless, blinked targets or cues do not
go completely unnoticed by the system and can already start
eliciting excitatory feedback. The next item, when it is another
target, benefits from this, resulting in an increased sparing. If the
next item turns out to be a distractor instead, substitution errors
may occur (Chun, 1997a; Isaak et al., 1999). As shown in Figure 8,
the blink’s reversal is indeed found in our simulation of the Olivers
et al. (2007) paradigm. In this simulation, we set dcatsame equal to
dcatdif (0.7) to model the fact that Olivers et al. had equalized
masking across targets and distractors. As shown in Figure 9, the
cueing data of Nieuwenstein et al. (2005) are, to a large extent, also
captured. Here, it is assumed that a distractor carrying the target-
defining property is treated as neither a distractor nor a target but
as an item with neutral relevance.
The Importance of the Distractors
As mentioned earlier, to explain lag-1 sparing, some have sug-
gested that whatever happens to the lag-1 item is independent of
what causes the attentional blink. However, this is directly at odds
with the evidence that the lag-1 item, when it is a distractor, is of
crucial importance in inducing an attentional blink in the first
place. In the previous section, we discussed the finding that . . .
TDT . . . sequences generate a blink for the final target, whereas
. . . TTT . . . sequences do not (Di Lollo et al., 2005; Olivers et al.,
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2007). The only difference between these conditions is the pres-
ence of a distractor between the targets. Furthermore, the atten-
tional blink is strongly reduced when the distractor following T1 is
replaced with a blank (Breitmeyer, Ehrenstein, Pritchard, Hiscock,
& Crisan, 1999; Chun & Potter, 1995; Grandison et al., 1997;
Raymond et al., 1992; Seiffert & Di Lollo, 1997), or when the
distractor following T1 is weakened because of inhibition or
repetition blindness (Drew & Shapiro, 2006; Dux et al., 2006).
There are also indications that the post-T1 distractor receives
relatively high levels of processing compared with other items in
the stream. For example, Chua et al. (2001) found that only
distractors presented at lag 1 could semantically prime a subse-
quent T2. As mentioned earlier, instead of T1, observers often
report the immediately following distractor (provided the type of
task allows for such errors to be made; Chun, 1997a; Isaak et al.,
1999; Raymond et al., 1992). At the same time, responses to a
target at the very end of the stream have been found to be inhibited
when it matches the post-T1 distractor (Loach & Marı´-Beffa,
2003). This suggests that the post-T1 distractor may first be
enhanced and then be suppressed.
Boost and bounce theory readily predicts all these findings. Within
the theory, the post-T1 distractor is essential to observing a blink
exactly because it induces the inhibition that causes the blink. Re-
moving or weakening the post-T1 distractor removes or reduces the
inhibition and, thus, the blink. At the same time, the post-T1 distractor
itself is so heavily boosted that it may act as a strong subconscious
prime or even break through the gate to consciousness.
Figure 10 shows the predictions from our model for the case in
which the lag-1 distractor is removed, compared with data from Chun
and Potter (1995). The model makes the additional assumption that a
gap in a continuous stream is slightly disruptive (i.e., it is a salient but
irrelevant event) that triggers a weak inhibitory response (at 1/10 of
the normal inhibitory response). Without this assumption, the pattern
looks the same, but the distractor after the gap induces a deeper
attentional blink. Figure 11 shows how the attentional blink is reduced
when the post-T1 distractor is weakened (Drew & Shapiro, 2006; Dux
et al., 2006). Figure 5 shows how the post-T1 distractor is first
enhanced and then suppressed but, nevertheless, generates substantial
activity, compared with other distractors.2
Finally, the post-T2 distractor also plays an important role in the
model. When the post-T2 distractor is removed, sensory activation
associated with T2’s identity lingers (as it is no longer masked).
Excitatory feedback elicited by T2 reaches its maximum while this
sensory activity is still around, whereas normally, it enhances the
post-T2 distractor more than T2. T2 is therefore perceived at a
delay, consistent with behavioral and neurophysiological data
(Dell’Acqua, Pascali, Jolicoeur, & Sessa, 2003; Giesbrecht & Di
Lollo, 1998; Jolicoeur & Dell’Acqua, 1998; Vogel & Luck, 2002;
Zuvic, Visser, & Di Lollo, 2000).
Similarity Effects
Not only the presence but also the nature of the distractors is
important. A number of studies have shown an aggravated attentional
blink when either the pre-target distractors, the post-target distractors,
or all the distractors in the stream, are similar to T1, T2, or both (Chun
& Potter, 1995; Dux & Coltheart, 2005; Ghorashi, Zuvic, Visser, &
Di Lollo, 2003; Giesbrecht, Bischof, & Kingstone, 2003; Isaak et al.,
1999; Kawahara, Enns, & Di Lollo, 2006; Maki, Couture, Frigen, &
Lien, 1997; Maki, Bussard, Lopez, & Digby, 2003; Maki & Padma-
nabhan, 1994; McAuliffe & Knowlton, 2000; Olivers & Watson,
2006; Raymond et al., 1995; Visser, Bischof, & Di Lollo, 2004).
Although it has been difficult to separate out the exact contributions,
similarity effects appear to occur on the level of visual features
(probably involving masking), as well as on conceptual/semantic
levels. Furthermore, manipulations of target–distractor similarity of-
ten also involved variations in similarity within the distractor set itself.
Finally, it is often difficult to assess whether similarity affects overall
performance or specifically affects the attentional blink (i.e., interacts with
lag). This is because potential ceiling effects allow less room for improve-
ment at later lags than at the usually more affected shorter lags.
Within our model, increased similarity between items (within or
between categories) reduces the sensory input signal to gate neu-
rons and, thus, both the strength of excitatory and inhibitory
feedback elicited by targets and distractors, respectively. Further-
more, as targets and distractors become less distinguishable, there
is an increased necessity for top-down gating to extract the rele-
vant items from the stream. The net result is a deeper attentional
blink. Figure 12 shows simulated attentional blinks for a range of
within- and between-category similarities (parameters dcatsame and
dcatdif, respectively).
A New Prediction: The Attentional Blink Can Be
Postponed
Boost and bounce theory also makes new predictions. One
prediction is that the attentional blink is not time-locked to T1 but
to the first post-T1 item that does not resemble a target (and that
therefore induces strong inhibition). The prediction then is that
inserting post-T1 distractors that do not induce strong inhibition
will lead to a postponement of the attentional blink until a distrac-
tor is encountered that does. We did this by making the post-T1
distractors carry the target-defining feature, as is illustrated in
Figure 13a. We started from an attentional blink task in which
observers were asked to report the two red letters in a stream of
black digits. We assume that observers set up their gating system
(or attentional set) such that red items led to excitatory feedback,
whereas black items led to inhibitory feedback. In the standard
condition, the red T1 was usually followed by a black distractor
(except at lag 1), and a standard attentional blink pattern was
expected. The interesting case is the T1  1 red condition, in
which the distractor immediately following T1 was also red. Our
model predicts that, simply because it carries a target feature, this
distractor will not induce the inhibition invoked by the standard
black distractor. In fact, the target resembling distractor is treated
as neutral (neither target nor distractor) by the model, and the
excitatory feedback invoked by T1 continues unhindered. The
2 It is interesting to note that Seiffert and Di Lollo (1997) found a clear
attentional blink, even when the lag-1 distractor was removed, as long as
T1 itself was degraded by a simultaneous mask. This appears at odds with
our model, which assigns a central role to the post-T1 distractor. However,
if we assume that degrading T1 results in slower processing of T1, then the
triggering of excitatory feedback is delayed too. In other words, instead of
the lag-1 item, the lag-2 item now receives the bulk of the processing. If
this item is a distractor, it will result in a blink for subsequent items. Thus,
a full but delayed attentional blink is predicted, as was exactly found by
Seiffert and Di Lollo (1997).
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model thus predicts that the attentional blink will not be fully
induced until the next black item appears, which, in this case, is the
T1  2 distractor. In other words, the entire attentional blink
function should shift later in time by one lag. Similarly, in the
T1 2 red condition, we inserted two red distractors after T1. The
model now predicts that the same attentional blink function should
shift even further back. In sum, the attentional blink is postponed.
Figure 13b shows this prediction.
Limited-capacity theories predict something rather different.
First of all, no postponement is predicted, simply because the
attentional blink is time-locked to T1. After all, it is the second-
stage processing of T1 that is assumed to be the major culprit
behind the attentional blink. Second, such theories have often
assumed that T1 induces a blink because it is masked by a
distractor. If anything, then, making the post-T1 distractor similar
to T1 (by giving it the same color) should make it more difficult to
maintain the same level of T1 performance, resulting in a deeper
blink for T2. In a similar vein, Shapiro and Raymond’s (1994)
interference theory, with its emphasis on similarity, would predict
that T2 suffers more from the red distractors than from the black
distractors, simply because the red distractors match the target
template better and are therefore stronger competitors for selec-
tion. So again, a deeper blink, but no postponement, is predicted.
Finally, similar to the boost and bounce model, TLC theory might
predict that the input filter remains intact as long as items carrying
the target feature enter the system, and an attentional blink is only
induced when the filter is disrupted. However, unlike our model,
TLC predicts the attentional blink to remain time-locked to T1,
because it assumes that it is T1 processing that prevents the central
executive from maintaining the input filter. As soon as the central
executive is available again, the input filter should be reinstanti-
ated, regardless of the type of intervening distractors.
Method
Participants. Eighteen participants (9 male) were included in
the study, ranging in age from 18 to 33 years (M 22.3 years). They
were paid €7 (about $11) per hour. One more participant was run, but
she showed no standard attentional blink (performance consistently at
100%, except for one lag at 95%) and was therefore excluded. All
other participants showed an attentional blink effect (maximum T2
performance  minimum T2 performance) of at least 10%.
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Figure 10. (A) T2 identification performance as a function of T1-T2 lag either in a standard attentional blink
task or when a gap is inserted at lag 1 (in other words, the lag 1 distractor is removed), as adapted from “A
Two-Stage Model for Multiple Detection in Rapid Serial Visual Presentation,” M. M. Chun & M. C. Potter,
1995, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 21, Figure 4, p. 114.
Copyright 1995 by the American Psychological Association. (B) Model results.
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Figure 11. (A) T2 identification performance as a function of T1-T2 lag for two conditions: One in which the
first post-T1 distractor has the same identity as the distractor immediately preceding T1 (“repeated”) and one in
which it has a different identity (“nonrepeated”; equivalent to a standard blink paradigm). Data adapted from “On
the Fate of Distractor Stimuli in Rapid Serial Visual Presentation,” P. E. Dux, V. Coltheart, & I. Harris, 2006,
Cognition, 99, 355–382. Copyright 2006 by Elsevier. (B) Model results.
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Stimulus, design, and procedure. Stimulus generation and re-
sponse recording were done using E-Prime (Psychology Software
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Backgrounds were gray (40 cd/m2). After a
1000-ms blank period, a 0.5  0.5° black fixation cross was
presented for 1000 ms in the center of the display and was
subsequently replaced by a rapid serial presentation of 24
characters, most of which were black digits, presented in Cou-
rier New (approximately 0.8  0.8° in size). Digits were
randomly drawn from the set 2–9, with the restriction that no
two consecutive digits could be the same. Each item was
presented for 67 ms, followed by a 25-ms blank (SOA  92
ms). At position 8 –10 in the stream, a first red letter (T1)
replaced one of the black digits. At various lags (1–12), a
second red letter (T2) replaced another black digit. The partic-
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ipant’s task was to report the red letters at the end of the trial,
unspeeded. The letters I, O, Q, and S were excluded. The
important manipulation involved the nature of the digit distrac-
tors between T1 and T2. In the standard condition, these were
all black. In the T1  1 red condition, the digit immediately
following T1 was red. In the T1  2 red condition, the two
distractors following T1 were both red. In the standard condi-
tion, T2 would follow at lag 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, or 10. In the T1 
1 red condition, T2 could never appear at lag 1 (as this lag was
occupied by the red distractor), and thus, lags 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9,
and 11 were used instead. Similarly, in the T1  2 red condi-
tion, lags were 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, and 12. All conditions were
randomly mixed in six blocks of 96 trials each. The first block
was regarded as practice. In all, this resulted in 20 trials per cell.
The experiment lasted a little more than 1 hr.
Results and Discussion
Mean percentages correct for T1 and T2 (contingent upon T1
correct) were calculated, with order reversals counted as correct.
Overall, T1 performance was high at 94%, with little difference
across conditions or lag, with the exception that T1 performance
dropped to 80% when it was immediately followed by T2 (as was
the case only for lag 1 in the standard condition). For other lags
and conditions, there were no significant effects, although there
was a trend toward deteriorated performance when T1 was fol-
lowed by red distractors, F(1, 17)  3.45, MSE  0.002, p  .081
(all other ps  0.10). This is to be expected under the assumption
that similar distractors act as somewhat stronger masks for T1.
Figure 13c shows T2 performance contingent upon T1 correct.
In line with the model’s predictions, the pattern of results suggests
a clear postponement of the attentional blink with increasing
number of post-T1 distractors. In the standard condition, sparing
occurred for lag 1, whereas the trough of the blink fell at lag 2. In
the T1  1 red condition, relative sparing occurred at lag 2,
whereas the trough occurred at lag 3. In the T1  2 red condition,
sparing occurred at lag 3, whereas the trough occurred at lag 5.
Because not all lags were the same for all distractor conditions, a
single analysis of variance involving the full experimental design
was not possible. However, the pattern of results in Figure 13c was
statistically confirmed when taking only the common lags into
account. An analysis of variance with distractor condition (stan-
dard, T1  1 red, T1  2 red) and the four lags they had in
common (lags 3, 4, 5, 6) as factors revealed a significant Distractor
Condition  Lag interaction, F(6, 102)  5.16, p  .001. The
same was true when comparing only the standard to the T1 1 red
condition on all common lags (2, 3, 4, 5, 6), F(4, 68)  8.52, p 
.001, and when comparing the T1  2 red with the T1  1 red
condition on all common lags (3, 4, 5, 6, 7), F(4, 68)  6.44, p 
.001. Finally, the interaction also held when comparing the T1 
2 red condition with the standard condition on common lags (3, 4,
5, 6, 8, 10), F(5, 85)  3.82, p  .01. In this latter comparison,
there was also a main effect of distractor condition, F(1, 17) 
21.0, p  .001, indicating that performance was overall worse
when T1 was followed by two red distractors.
The data largely confirm the model’s predictions. When the
post-T1 distractors are at least partly relevant to the gating system,
the inhibition is delayed, leading to a postponed attentional blink.
As we stated earlier, to qualitatively capture as many data patterns
as possible with a limited set of parameters, we kept parameter
values constant for all simulations. With these parameter values,
there are some differences between the model’s performance and
human performance. First, the model shows an overall deeper
blink than did human observers.3 Second, the model shows rela-
tively stronger sparing at the first lag, following the last red
distractor. Third, the data show overall subdued (i.e., flattened)
attentional blink patterns for the T1 1 and T1 2 red conditions,
whereas this is not the case for the model. All these discrepancies
are more due to quantitative than qualitative differences, to the
extent that the model assigns relatively more weight to color than
humans might, resulting in stronger color-based modulation.
In any case, limited-capacity theories have difficulty explaining
the postponement of the attentional blink. Interference theory
(Shapiro & Raymond, 1994) predicts stronger interference and,
hence, a deeper blink from more similar distractors—in this case,
the red ones. Two-stage theory sees T1 as the cause of the blink
and therefore fails to explain its postponement. If anything, it
predicts that red distractors are stronger T1 masks (there was
indeed a trend in our data) and, hence, should result in more
resources being allocated to T1 at the expense of T2. As men-
tioned, TLC also predicts a data pattern time-locked to T1,
whereas the data suggest that the entire blink curve is shifted
backward in time. Finally, it is worth looking at order reversals. To
explain the relative sparing at lags 2 and 3 in the red distractor
conditions, Bowman and Wyble’s (2007) simultaneous type serial
token (ST2) model (as discussed later) might predict that the
spared item and T1 are bound to the same token, leading to
potential order reversals. However, although our data show sub-
stantial order reversals when T2 is spared at lag 1 (23%, in the
standard condition), there was no sign of increased order reversals
in the lag 2 and lag 3 sparing conditions (5% in the T1 1 red and
3% in the T1  2 red conditions, relative to 4% for black
distractors at the same lags). Thus, sparing does not necessarily go
together with order reversals.
General Discussion
We have presented a relatively straightforward theory that ex-
plains a considerable number of findings, some of which appeared
contradictory at the start. It proposes that target stimuli lead to
transient attentional enhancement, whereas distractor stimuli lead
to transient attentional suppression. This suppression is particu-
larly strong when distractors are first enhanced, as occurs during
the attentional blink.
All of the individual components of our theory have been proposed
before in the literature on visual attention. What is new about the
theory, however, is the combination of these components and how
they interact, allowing for an integrated account of how selection
takes place in time. The important novel theoretical step is that
selection from rapid visual streams can be accounted for by the
interplay of two identical feedback functions, both rapidly rising and
more slowly decaying but opposite in sign. As a consequence, and as
3 We fully replicated the experiment with a more difficult set of targets
and distractors. Overall, the blink was much deeper, and sparing was
reduced; but again, the attentional blink was clearly postponed by red
distractors.
852 OLIVERS AND MEETER
a crucial departure from existing theories, there is no central role for
limited-capacity resources in our theory. According to Boost and
Bounce theory, the biggest piece of evidence for such limitations—the
attentional blink—does actually not reflect an extended failure of
attention but, rather, its intact, responsive, and rapid operation, mod-
ulating the input within about 100 ms. In fact, the attentional blink is
caused by too strong an attentional response, rather than by too weak
an attentional response. The same strong response accounts for tran-
sient attention effects in the cueing studies. Thus, the theory integrates
classic transient attention findings with the classic phenomenon of the
attentional blink with a relatively limited set of assumptions. It ex-
plains numerous associated findings, such as lag-1 sparing, sparing at
later lags; the time-based, rather than item-based, nature of the phe-
nomena; apparent trade-offs between T1 and T2; the importance of
the distractors; variations in the processing of distractors; similarity
effects; and rapid reversals of the blink. By regarding the attentional
blink as the direct counterpart of the transient attentional episode, the
theory does away with what seemed to be ad hoc explanations of
some of these findings. Finally, the theory’s computational imple-
mentation successfully captures all these effects with a minimal set of
parameters with fixed values and generates new predictions. In short,
the theory can explain more data with fewer assumptions than most
other theories.
There are now a number of theories and computational models of
temporal attention, some of which, at the surface, bear similarity to
ours. Most of these are theories of the attentional blink. Here we
discuss a few of them in detail, whereas others have already been
extensively discussed and dismissed by Bowman and Wyble (2007).
Relation to Other Models and Theories: Temporary
Suppression Models
As mentioned, boost and bounce theory comes closest to the
temporary suppression account originally proposed by Raymond et al
(1992). They proposed that T1 initiates an attentional episode that
includes the post-T1 distractor. This post-T1 distractor then initiates a
period of suppression, during which subsequent items are missed.
However, the accounts also differ in important respects:
1. As mentioned earlier, Raymond et al. (1992) hypothe-
sized that the inhibition operates at an early visual stage
of processing. To account for the high level representa-
tions of blinked items, boost and bounce theory proposes
that the inhibition is initiated late, at the level of working
memory entrance. However, inhibition does trickle down
the representational hierarchy to lower-level representa-
tions, affecting the processing of later items.
2. Whereas Raymond et al.’s (1992) account assumed the
inhibition to be ballistic and nonadaptive to changes in
the stream, in boost and bounce theory, the gating is
dynamic and flexible. This allows for the attentional
blink to be postponed (see the new experiment here) or
rapidly reversed (Di Lollo et al., 2005; Olivers et al.,
2007; Kawahara, Kumada, & Di Lollo, 2006; Nieuwen-
stein et al., 2005).
3. Raymond et al. (1992) proposed that the inhibition is nec-
essary to protect T1 from conjunction errors. As such, it
predicts that the blink is time-locked to the T1-versus-first-
distractor conflict. In contrast, within boost and bounce
theory, T1 does not need to be protected. The theory does
not assume that the post-T1 item must be inhibited for T1 to
be reported correctly. The inhibition is not triggered by the
potential for conjunction errors, conflict, or competition
between T1 and the post-T1 item (or between T1 and T2 for
that matter) and, thus, is not time-locked to T1. Instead, the
inhibition is triggered by a mismatch between a strong
incoming signal and the attentional set for the target (see
also Olivers & Watson, 2006).
The idea that T1 requires some form of protection has recently
returned in a number of verbal and computational models. For
example, Hommel et al. (2006) proposed that the post-T1 inhibi-
tion is a direct consequence of the attentional network being able
to process only one object at a time: The network “silences itself”
in an attempt to preserve T1. The idea of a (potential for) conflict
between T1 and the post-T1 distractor also returns in Battye’s
(2006) account of the blink. As we propose here, his model
assumes that T1 triggers a temporary enhancement of the post-T1
distractors, causing maximum conflict in the output layers of the
network. This conflict is registered and results in stronger lateral
inhibition between the output units. T2, when it arrives, suffers
from this lateral inhibition, resulting in an attentional blink. As the
conflict is being resolved, the blink subsides again. As with Ray-
mond et al.’s (1992) original proposal, one problem with these
models is that the inhibition is ballistic and irreversible, contrary to
what the data suggest (Olivers et al., 2007; the current experiment).
What is more, the idea that higher structures cannot deal with more
than one item at a time is highly reminiscent of resource-depletion
theories and, thus, suffers from the arguments against these theo-
ries we made earlier.
ST2
A number of other computational models of the attentional blink
feature an enhanced response following T1, and many also feature
inhibition (Bowman & Wyble, 2007; Chartier et al., 2004;
Dehaene et al., 2003; Fragopanagos et al., 2005; Nieuwenhuis et
al., 2005). However, in all these models, the enhanced T1 repre-
sentation either directly inhibits the T2 representation (as a type of
lateral inhibition), or it inhibits a type of resource (e.g., working
memory capacity or attentional enhancement) that is then not
available to T2. These models are therefore actually straightfor-
ward limited-capacity models, suffering from the same arguments
we made earlier.
Probably the most sophisticated of these models is the ST2
model of Bowman and Wyble (2007). The ST2 model is a
neural network combining Chun and Potter’s (1995) two-stage
theory with Kanwisher’s (1987) type/token distinction. Types
are general, context-free representations of objects (such as letters
or digits), which may be activated in parallel, without capacity
limitations. In contrast, tokens are specific, episodic instances of
an object (e.g., the digit “6” presented about midway in the
stream). For conscious report, the type representations need to be
bound to tokens. This binding occurs in a binding pool. It is
important to note that, according to Bowman and Wyble (2007),
this tokenization takes time and occurs serially: In principle, only
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one token at a time can be bound to a type. Furthermore, the
tokenization requires a blaster. The blaster is triggered by, and
causes attentional enhancement of, T1, so that it can be bound to
a token. The blaster also spills over to the next item, so that
occasionally, both items may be bound to the same token. This
explains lag-1 sparing, and, because temporal information is lost
within a token, it also explains the order reversals often found to
accompany lag-1 sparing. The attentional blink is explained by
assuming that the system seeks to prevent false bindings of
post-T1 items to the same token. Therefore, the tokenization
process must be temporarily halted. This is done by inhibiting the
blaster for a period of several hundreds of milliseconds, until the
tokenization of T1 is completed. With a switched-off blaster,
subsequent items no longer receive the attentional enhancement
necessary for tokenization (and, thus, for conscious report), result-
ing in an attentional blink. With this architecture, ST2 can explain
an impressive range of data (Bowman & Wyble, 2007).
There are obvious similarities between ST2 and boost and bounce
theory, most notably the presence of both excitatory and inhibitory
components. However, there are also fundamental differences:
1. The ST2 model is, in essence, a hybrid limited-
capacity/T1 protection model similar to the ones we
discussed above: Tokenization capacity is limited, and to
protect the system from false T1 token bindings, subse-
quent processing is inhibited. Boost and bounce theory
argues that there is no need to assume a role for such
limitations or protection mechanisms in explaining the
attentional blink. A flexible but slightly delayed gating
mechanism is sufficient.
2. Within the ST2 model, the inhibition is triggered by T1
and is ballistic. It therefore cannot easily explain the
spread sparing. The ST2 model may be stretched so that
the tokenization process can include more than two suc-
cessive targets. To account for the Olivers et al. data
(2007), Bowman and Wyble (2007) suggested that the
blaster may rapidly refire when incoming information
remains relevant. As a result, a continuous sequence of
targets can be encoded together into working memory
(Bowman, Wyble, Chennu, & Craston, 2008; Wyble,
Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, in press). This way, the the-
ory might also account for the postponement of the blink,
as found in the present experiment. However, it would
have to assume that the post-T1 distractors are also
tokenized (as they did not inhibit the blaster).
3. It appears to us that even an ongoing blaster within ST2
could not easily account for rapid reversals of the atten-
tional blink. Here a full blink for a second target was first
induced (suggesting that the inhibition must therefore
have been triggered), but then a third target escaped the
attentional blink when immediately following the second.
This goes against the irreversible inhibition of a blaster.
Now not only continuous firing but also rapid resumption
of the blaster (once it is inhibited) would have to be
assumed. The big question regarding Points 2 and 3, then,
is why ST2 would allow for such rapid lifting of the
inhibition when it deems the inhibition necessary to pro-
tect T1 in the first place. It appears then that the inhibi-
tion protects against something that is not really a threat.
In contrast, our boost and bounce model has little trouble
with reversing the blink. It assumes that the gate to
working memory responds dynamically and adaptively to
the incoming sensory information, closing when distrac-
tors enter, opening when targets enter.
The Locus Coeruleus Norepinephrine Model
Another model we discuss here is the locus coeruleus norepi-
nephrine (LC-NE) model proposed by Nieuwenhuis et al. (2005).
According to this neurocomputational model, the attentional blink
is the consequence of the dynamics of the LC, which is the brain
stem nucleus responsible for the release of NE in the neocortex.
The NE release is believed to have an attention-enhancing effect
and, according to Nieuwenhuis et al., is a necessary condition for
target awareness. It is interesting to note that LC activity peaks
around 100 ms after target onset and, because of auto-inhibition, is
then followed by a refractory period of between 200 and 400 ms,
during which it cannot fire again (at least in monkeys—little
is known about the exact LC dynamics in humans; Aston-Jones,
Rajkowski, & Cohen, 2000). According to Nieuwenhuis et al.,
lag-1 sparing corresponds directly to the peak, whereas the atten-
tional blink corresponds directly to the refractory period. The
LC-NE model differs from the boost and bounce model in that the
former is, in essence, a limited-capacity resource model. As in
the classic attentional blink models, T1 uses up a vital resource that it
requires for detection (namely, LC firing and NE release). This
resource is then temporarily unavailable to subsequent targets (be-
cause of the refractory period). The problem with this is that the
LC-NE model cannot explain why the attentional blink is so depen-
dent on the distractors intervening T1 and T2. This is because the LC
is triggered by T1, and thus, a refractory period follows, regardless of
the presence or nature of the subsequent items. In a similar vein,
because it operates in a ballistic fashion, the LC-NE model cannot
deal with the sparing of multiple targets and the attentional blink
reversal effects mentioned earlier (Di Lollo et al., 2005; Olivers et al.,
2007). Nor can it explain the postponement of the blink in the
currently presented experiment. Nevertheless, the LC-NE system re-
mains a strong contender for contributing to the transient attentional
enhancement effects that are at the core of our model. It is possible
that the NE release further modulates the gating of relevant and
irrelevant sensory input, thus aggravating the attentional blink (see
also Olivers, 2007, for the idea that the LC might be an engine behind
transient attentional enhancement).
Gating Theory
The idea that input is filtered, or gated, by working memory has
been proposed by many but computationally implemented by few.
One of the most prominent mathematical descriptions of how this
takes place as a function of time is the gating theory developed by
Sperling and colleagues (Reeves & Sperling, 1986; Shih & Sper-
ling, 2002; Sperling & Reeves, 1980; Sperling & Weichselgartner,
1995). According to this theory, the occurrence of a relevant event
(e.g., a cue to switch streams or tasks) induces a transition from
one discreet attentional state to another. The time course of this
transition is described by a temporal transition function, which, on
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the basis of Sperling and colleagues’ RSVP work, was hypothe-
sized to be gamma-shaped (see Figure 2c). The idea of gating, as
well as the rapidly rising and slowly decaying signal (with the
shape of a gamma distribution), are at the heart of our model.
However, this is largely where the similarities end:
1. Boost and bounce model employs an excitatory as well as
an inhibitory gating function. Gating theory mentions
only attentional enhancement.
2. Gating theory was designed to describe the time course
that accompanies shifts or transitions in attention, when
either a spatial or a task switch is required. As such, it
cannot account for the attentional blink, which also oc-
curs when no such switches are necessary. In contrast, the
core of boost and bounce theory is designed to account
for pure temporal attention phenomena, focusing on sit-
uations in which all items appear in the same location and
belong to the same task, with the possibility to plug in
spatial and task-switch modules (as we have provision-
ally done in the current implementation).
Recently, to account for the attentional blink, Shih (2008) ex-
tended gating theory with a working memory consolidation pro-
cess that refuses to accept further input while it is busy dealing
with a target. Thus, this model, too, is a straightforward limited-
capacity resource model, facing the same problems with explain-
ing spread sparing and blink reversals that we saw before. For
example, to explain Nieuwenstein and Potter’s (2006) whole report
benefits, Shih (p. 5) merely assumed a “specific processing strat-
egy,” without further explanation.
No Capacity Limitations
The most important difference with existing theories is that
boost and bounce theory does away with limited-capacity re-
sources and bottlenecks as core explanations of some classic
temporal attention phenomena. Instead, our theory sees the time
course of attention as the direct result of the close to (but not quite)
optimal operation of run-of-the-mill selection mechanisms that
would serve the system just fine under natural circumstances—
selection mechanisms that also operate in numerous other attention
tasks, such as visual search, partial report, or Stroop-like tasks.
Relevant information leads to enhancement, whereas irrelevant
information leads to inhibition, all within roughly 100 ms. It is
simply that in the artificial case of the RSVP paradigm, these
enhancement and inhibition mechanisms are a fraction too late,
thus exerting their effects on the next object. Again, we do not
deny the existence of capacity limitations. In fact, they play some
role in our own theory, when we assume that working memory
capacity is limited to about four items (or a little more, when
allowing for mechanisms like chunking). This limitation predom-
inantly plays up when more than the maximum number of items
enter working memory (e.g., Nieuwenstein & Potter, 2006; Reeves
& Sperling, 1986), working memory is already filled by some
other task (e.g., Akyu¨rek & Hommel, 2005; Nieuwenstein, John-
son, Kanai, & Martens, 2007), or items in working memory need
to be reported in a certain order (Reeves & Sperling, 1986).
Psychological Refractory Period
Capacity limitations or bottlenecks also play an important role
in theories of the psychological refractory period (PRP; Pashler,
1984; Welford, 1952). The PRP is the temporary slowing of
responses to a second target when that target is presented shortly
after a first target. Although the PRP has been linked to the
attentional blink (e.g., Jolicoeur, 1998), we believe there are im-
portant methodological differences that would allow for two inde-
pendent effects. For one, within the PRP paradigm, observers
usually need to respond immediately and as quickly as possible to
both targets. Nevertheless, observers are typically fully aware of
both targets. This leaves open the possibility that the PRP is the
consequence of competition on the response level (reflecting a true
bottleneck), whereas in our view, the attentional blink reflects the
active gating of working memory access, even before this bottle-
neck can come into play (as the prerequisites for generating a
response are not even there). Second, PRP experiments typically
involve a clear task switch and, often, a sensory modality switch.
Such switches may be regarded as a contamination of the atten-
tional blink (as the blink also occurs perfectly without task-
switching components; Chun & Potter, 2001; Enns, Visser, Kawa-
hara, & Di Lollo, 2001; Potter, Chun, Banks, & Muckenhoupt,
1998). Third, the PRP paradigm is usually devoid of distractors,
whereas it has been shown that distractors play an important role
in the attentional blink paradigm. In all, then, the PRP appears to
reflect processes that occur after selection, whereas in the present
article, we are interested in the time course of selection itself (and
we argue that the attentional blink reflects just that). Marois and
Ivanoff (2005) have mentioned a few more grounds on which the
PRP and the attentional blink might be dissociated. Naturally,
however, our model could be extended with components important
for explaining PRP phenomena.
But What About Previously Reported Resource-Depletion
Effects in the Attentional Blink Paradigm?
Limited-capacity theories predict that T1 and T2 act like two
communicating vessels: The more resources T1 demands, the
fewer are left for T2. Surely there is evidence for that? Well, in our
view, the evidence is actually rather thin. A number of studies have
indeed found that more difficult T1s lead to deeper blinks for T2
(Grandison et al., 1997; Jolicoeur, 1998; Ouimet & Jolicoeur,
2007; Seiffert & Di Lollo, 1997; Shore, McLaughlin, & Klein,
2001; Visser, 2007). However, as also pointed out by McLaughlin,
Shore, and Klein (2001), many of the experimental procedures in
these studies involved a task switch from T1 to T2 (and some even
involved a location switch). Switch costs may be aggravated by a
difficult T1 task, whereas the attentional blink itself is not. Some
experiments required participants to respond immediately to T1,
which, together with the task switch, turns the procedure into a
PRP paradigm, with possible bottlenecks at the response-selection
level (see the previous section). Moreover, others have changed
the post-T1 mask as a way to make T1 more difficult to identify.
However, also in boost and bounce theory, a stronger mask is
predicted to result in a stronger blink, simply because it induces
stronger inhibition. As argued earlier, differential masking can also
partly explain the T1/T2 tradeoff found by Potter et al. (2002).
Other studies failed to find a tradeoff altogether (McLaughlin et
al., 2001; Shapiro et al., 1994; Ward et al., 1997) or reported only
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additive effects (i.e., T1 load did not interact with lag or presen-
tation time, suggesting that it affects stages independent of what
causes the attentional blink; Akyu¨rek & Hommel, 2005; Jolicoeur
& Dell’Acqua, 2000; Nieuwenstein et al., 2007; Olivers et al.,
2007). Again, others have reported an opposite tradeoff (deeper
blinks after easier T1s; Chua, 2005).
Conversely, T2 performance can be improved without impeding
T1 performance. Participants in our lab occasionally reported that
they felt they did better when they did not focus so strongly on the
stimulus stream, an observation also made earlier by Kahneman
(1973). Olivers and Nieuwenhuis (2005, 2006; see also Arend,
Johnston, & Shapiro, 2006, and Ho, Mason, & Spence, 2006) put
this observation to the test by comparing performance in a standard
attentional blink condition, in which participants were instructed to
concentrate on the task, with performance in conditions in which
observers were somewhat distracted from the central task. For
example, we asked them to actively think about their holiday
plans, to listen to a repetitive tune and detect an occasional yell in
it, to perform an additional memory task, or to simply concentrate
a little less. All these manipulations had the same effect: Detection
of the second target improved under conditions intended to invoke
a more distributed attentional state, suggesting that taking away
attentional resources may actually be beneficial, rather than detri-
mental (but see T. Spalek & V. Di Lollo, personal communication,
summer 2005, for a failure to replicate). Similarly, using multiple
RSVP streams, Kristja´nsson and Nakayama (2002) found the
attentional blink to be more reduced the further away T2 was from
the stream containing T1 and, thus, the fewer resources were
presumably allocated to the T2 stream. Furthermore, Slagter et al.
(2007) found that extensive meditation practice leads to a reduced
attentional blink. It is important to note that in none of these
studies did the improvement in T2 performance go at the expense
of T1 performance.
In a similar vein, a study by Ferlazzo, Lucido, Di Nocera,
Fagioli, and Sdoia (2007) also suggests that processing resources
are not necessarily limited to one target, at the expense of the other
target. They found a standard attentional blink for the second of
two targets when participants were instructed to report “each of the
two targets.” However, using identical RSVPs, they found a re-
duced blink when the instruction was to report “the pair of targets.”
The blink was even virtually absent when the instructions were to
report “the sum of the targets” (when they were digits) or “the
syllable formed by the targets” (when they were letters). Ferlazzo
et al. argued that normally, participants treat T1 and T2 report as
separate goals, between which they then need to switch. It is this
goal switch that causes the attentional blink. When participants are
induced to adopt a more holistic, distributed task set, the atten-
tional blink is reduced or absent. Finally, the fact that the atten-
tional blink disappears when the RSVP stream can be treated as a
single, gradually changing object (Raymond, 2003; Kellie & Sha-
piro, 2004) also points toward the conclusion that what matters is
the selection mechanism itself (i.e., whether or not individual items
need to be selected from the stream) and not so much what
happens to T1 after selection.
Whereas limited-capacity theories have difficulties explain-
ing these results, our theory readily explains why there is no
unequivocal evidence for resource depletion or structural bot-
tlenecks in the attentional blink. This is because resource de-
pletion plays no central role in our theory. Moreover, a more
holistic or distributed approach toward the stream would mean
a weaker inhibitory response to the distractors and, thus, a
weaker blink, simply because distractors are not treated as such
(or not as strongly).
Neurophysiology
The attentional mechanisms we have proposed here are consis-
tent with what is known about the nervous system. The idea that
selection takes place through a rapid spread of recurrent processing
down the representational hierarchy has been proposed before
(Di Lollo et al., 2000) and has been directly linked to neurophys-
iological processes (Dehaene et al., 1998; Grossberg, 1995;
Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). There is also ample evidence that
such recurrent processes might be biased in advance of stimulus
presentation, effectively allowing for an attentional filter or tem-
plate to be set up (e.g., Chelazzi, Duncan, Miller, & Desimone,
1998; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Motter, 1994). A likely source
for such biasing or gating signals is prefrontal cortex, an area
linked to working memory function (E. K. Miller, Erickson, &
Desimone, 1996; E. K. Miller & Cohen, 2001). The prefrontal
cortex has long-range feedback connections to extrastriate visual
areas as well as the inferotemporal cortex, making it the prime
candidate for hosting the gate neurons that we assume modulate
the rise and fall of attention in response to incoming stimuli. A
recent study by McNab and Klinberg (2008) is especially interest-
ing here. In their functional magnetic resonance imaging study,
they found the posterior part of the middle frontal gyrus to become
active when observers were instructed to expect distractors during
a subsequent working memory task (without the stimuli being
present yet), indicating that this area represents the task settings
necessary to reject distractors. Activity in another structure, the
basal ganglia, was also increased prior to distractor rejection and
correlated negatively with the unnecessary storage of items in
working memory, as indicated by parietal activity (Vogel, McCol-
lough, & Machizawa, 2005). This led Awh and Vogel (2008) to
call the prefrontal cortex/basal ganglia network “the bouncer in the
brain.” It is interesting to note that the basal ganglia, in turn, have
been proposed to provide the transient boost of activity necessary
to update working memory (Hazy et al., 2006), making it another
serious candidate for being an engine behind transient attention in
our model.
Further evidence comes from electroencephalography (EEG)
studies. The frontal cortex is also the source of the event-related
potential known as the frontal selection positivity (FSP; Potts,
2004). This component is known to respond selectively to task-
relevant stimuli and may correlate with the gating mechanisms
governing access to working memory. Two EEG studies using
attentional blink tasks show an encouraging pattern of findings in
this respect. At frontal electrode sites, Martens, Munneke, et al.
(2006) found a marked positivity roughly 250 ms after T1 onset,
relative to a condition in which there was no T1. It is interesting to
note that, after approximately 100–150 ms, the FSP was followed
by a marked and prolonged negativity in the EEG signal, relative
to the no-target baseline. This negativity reached its peak shortly
after the FSP, gradually returning to baseline over a period of
300–500 ms. Niedeggen, Hesselman, Sharaie, Milders, and Blake-
more (2004) reported a highly similar pattern and indeed linked it
to a “postperceptual frontal gating mechanism that controls the
856 OLIVERS AND MEETER
access of visual stimuli to higher order evaluation” (p. 584). We
believe that this post-FSP negativity may reflect a direct neuro-
physiological correlate of the attentional blink, in terms of locus as
well as time course.4
Another EEG component that appears diagnostic of the atten-
tional blink is the P3/P300, with the M300 as its magnetoencepha-
lography counterpart. The P3 is a broad, positive event-related
brain potential probably encompassing multiple components but
with a modal peak latency of about 300–350 ms after stimulus
onset. It has often been associated with the updating of working
memory (Donchin & Coles, 1988; Vogel & Luck, 2002). With
regard to the attentional blink, there is a positive correlation
between T2 accuracy and the amplitude and/or latency of the P3
elicited by T2 (Kessler et al., 2005; Rolke et al., 2001; Sergent et
al., 2005; Vogel et al., 1998). At the same time, T2 accuracy has
also been found to correlate negatively with the amplitude of the
P3 elicited by T1 (Martens, Johnson, Elmallah, & London, 2006;
McArthur, Budd, & Michie, 1999; Shapiro, Schmitz, Martens,
Hommel, & Schnitzler, 2006). These findings appear to lend
support to the idea of a trade-off in resources between T1 and T2
on the level of working memory. However, one needs to keep in
mind that these relationships are purely correlational, not causal.
This means that a third factor may explain the negative corre-
lation between the P3 to T1 and the P3 to T2. For example,
imagine the following scenario: On a particular trial, T1 is
detected and elicits a particularly strong attentional enhance-
ment, which is then measured as a strong P3. The strong
enhancement also carries over to the post-T1 distractor, with an
equally strong inhibitory response as a result. Because of this
strong suppression, T2 is less likely to enter working memory
and is, hence, less likely to trigger a P3. This explains why
strong blinks correlate with strong P3s to T1 and weak P3s to
T2. Thus, in this scenario, the negative correlation between T1
and T2 does not reflect a direct tradeoff in resources between
the two targets but, rather, a common underlying third factor,
namely a strong attentional boost. At present, excitatory feed-
back in our model is of fixed strength and length, which is
sufficient to account for averaged data. Naturally, it could be
made variable to account for differences between individual
trials.
Conclusion
Boost and bounce theory comprehensively and coherently ex-
plains the time course of attention and associated phenomena in
number of different paradigms involving rapid serial processing.
Moreover, the theory has been made explicit in a working com-
putational model based on a minimum of assumptions and makes
testable new predictions. Finally, it appears to connect well with
current knowledge of the neurophysiology of attention. There is no
doubt that, as a theory of attention, the theory is far from complete.
Notably, the interactions with spatial and feature processing need
to be made explicit, as do the higher-end mechanisms involved in
the setting up and switching of tasks and the selection and con-
solidation of response representations. What the present work aims
to demonstrate is that the dynamics of attention can largely be
captured by a straightforward gating system, thus fulfilling atten-
tion’s classic role as the gatekeeper between sensory and response
processes.
4 The linking of inhibitory processing to a negative component is acci-
dental, as the polarity of event-related potential components is a function
of brain anatomy, not physiology.
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Appendix
Technical Details of the Model
The model consists of two parts, namely (a) sensory activity
and (b) a gating system that governs entrance to working
memory (WM). Both are defined by mathematical formulas that
describe the activity of sets of interacting model neurons.
Low-level sensory processes that lead up to the relevant per-
ceptual representations (i.e., identity, category, and color) are
not explicitly modeled, and neither are the high-level consoli-
dation and response-generation processes in WM. Such pro-
cesses, of course, take place, but within our model, they play no
crucial role in explaining the data. The crucial role is played by
the gating between the sensory memory and WM stages. All
simulations were run in discrete time steps of 1 ms. The code
used in the simulations can be found at http://olivers.cogpsy.nl.
Sensory Activity
The stream of inputs to the model are taken from the paradigms
that are simulated. Of each item in the stream, the presentation
duration, identity, category, and color are coded.
A first set of equations models the activity of sensory neurons
that code for the identity, category (letters, digits, or symbols),
and color of an item. We collectively refer to these neurons as
first-stage neurons. The total activity of these sensory neurons
is the product of bottom-up input and of attention already
directed at the stream location, as generated by preceding items
(later, we explain how activity is also convolved with attention
generated by item j itself). Consider an item j that is presented
from time steps ton to toff at location l. Sensory activity for item
j at time step t, aj,t, is the product of the bottom-up input
generated by j and bj, and of the attention directed at the
location generated by preceding items, gl,t, at a delay of 25 ms:
aj,t  gl,t25 bj,t. (A1)
Here, gl,t-25 can be regarded as the “prior attentional state,” as
generated by all the previous items (i.e., prior to the attention yet
to be triggered by the current item). The 25 ms simulates signaling
delays in the effects that these previous items exert on the current
item. The bottom-up input bj,t is governed by the following equations:
bj,t  0 for t  ton, (A2a)
bj,t  sjctranstrans(t  ton)etrans(t ton) csus 1  11  sus(t ton)
for ton  t  toff, (A2b)
and
bj,t  bj,toff edec(t  toff) for t  toff. (A2c)
The bottom-up input bj,t is equal to 0 before ton (see Equation
A2a). On the time steps that j is presented, it generates a transient
(trans) signal and an additional sustained (sus) signal (see Equation
A2b), both multiplied by strength sj. Following others (e.g., Busey
& Loftus, 1994), we modeled the transient signal as having the
shape of a gamma distribution. Its form is determined by a shape
parameter (not made explicit in Equation A2b but set to 2) and a
scale parameter trans, with value 0.04. The scaling constant of the
transient signal, ctrans, is equal to 3. We added the sustained signal
to account for activity generated by sustained stimulus presenta-
tions: Although activity seen in brain areas involved in vision
shows a marked transient, it does not decay back to zero with
sustained presentation (e.g., Gawne & Martin, 2002). The sus-
tained signal rises more slowly as the item is presented, with time
constant sus  1/10, to a maximum of csus (equal to 0.5). The
resulting function resembles recorded responses of neurons in
the visual system (e.g., Keysers & Perrett, 2002). More sophis-
ticated accounts of how this activation pattern emerges from
mechanisms at the individual neuronal level exist but are be-
yond the scope of the present model (see, e.g., Huber &
O’Reilly, 2003). After presentation, bj,t falls exponentially (see
Equation A2c), with dec determining the speed of decay (the
higher dec, the faster decay; decay depends on masking, see
below). Salient visual offsets, such as a gap within a rapid serial
visual presentation task (RSVP; Lawrence, 1971) stream, are
also assumed to produce transient signals (see, e.g., J. Miller,
1989; Watson & Humphreys, 1995, for behavioral evidence). In
the model, gaps within a stream therefore produce the same
bottom-up signal as do items.
The strength of the bottom-up signals for item j, sj in Equation
A2b, incorporates forward masking and the adaptation caused by
item repetitions in a stream. Forward masking is stronger the more
similar two items are, and this is implemented by making sj a
function of the contrast between item j and the item that precedes
it (see Equation A3). Adaptation is implemented by making sj a
function of the distance in time between the onset of the current
and the onset of the last presentation of the item:
sj
1
dcoldcat1 decayton ton,prev. (A3)
In Equation 3, dcol is the color contrast. It is equal to dcoldif (0.9)
if j has a different color than its predecessor and to 1 if color
remains the same. The contrast in category, dcat, is equal to dcatdif
(0.7, unless specified otherwise) if j is from a different category
than its predecessor. It is equal to dcatsame (1, unless specified
otherwise) if the category remains the same. In accordance with
“repetition blindness” effects (Kanwisher, 1987), strength sj is
assumed to be lower if the item was recently presented in the
stream (i.e., the difference between the onset of the current pre-
sentation, ton, and the onset of the previous presentation, ton,prev,
is small) than when it was not. Adaptation resulting from the
presentation of items in previous trials is assumed to be negligible,
with ton  ton,prev effectively equal to infinity. Constant decay was
set to 50. This value results in a negative sj if the previous presenta-
tion was less than 50 ms ago, but at that speed, the presentations are
assumed to fuse and effectively become a single presentation. The
strength of the decay in Equation 2c, dec, incorporates backward
masking by making it dependent on the item following j: dec 
.05dcat dcol. Here, dcol and dcat have the same values as above but are
set by the contrast between item j and the following item instead
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of the preceding item. This implies that dec is smaller (and, thus,
decay is slower and masking is weaker) the more dissimilar item
j and the following item are.
Attentional Gating
Items generate a top-down gating response. Targets generate
excitatory attention to their location, distractors generate inhibi-
tion. Both excitation and inhibition are transient signals, governed
by a function with the same shape as the one for visual transients.
The assumed mechanism is one where sensory activity drives gate
neurons, which, in turn, modulate the sensory activity. The acti-
vation of gate neurons has effects that take time to develop and
time to subside. Behaviorally, this transient response corresponds
to transient attention (Nakayama & Mackeben, 1989). The
strength of the excitatory or inhibitory gating response is assumed
to depend on the strength of the bottom-up evidence for a target or
distractor. For practical purposes, the model takes the sensory
activity during the first 15 ms of presentation as a measure of
perceptual strength. The attentional response to item j on time step
t, fj,t, is excitatory for targets (see Equation A4a) and inhibitory for
distractors (see Equation A4b). Both are set relative to a baseline
of 1:
fj,t 1 wj u  tonton  15 aj,u[cattatt (t ton)eatt(t  ton)]
for t  ton  15 and j: target; (A4a)
fj,t
1
1 wj u  tonton  15aj,u[cattatt (t ton)eatt(t ton)]
for t  ton  15 and j: distractor. (A4b)
On the first 15 time steps of presentation, the summation is from
ton to t, instead of to ton15, (i.e., from onset to the current time
step, so that in these 15 ms, gating does not depend on future
values). Here, constant catt  3, and time constant att  0.015.
Strength wj is dependent on the target in the simulated paradigm
and equals 1/(dcatdif  dcoldif). That is, targets can be defined by
category, color, or both, and the need for gating strength depends
on the relative salience of the bottom-up evidence. Gaps in the
stream are assumed to be slightly disruptive and are therefore
assumed to generate a slight inhibitory signal, with wj  0.1. If an
item has the target color but is of the alphanumeric distractor
category (so it is both target-like and distractor-like), it is treated
as neutral, with wj  0. Thus, fj,t is the attention generated by the
current item, and it modulates the activity of that item at no delay.
The net attentional gating devoted to the location of the stream,
l, is the product of the attention, both excitatory and inhibitory,
generated by all items preceding the current item:
gl,ti fi,t , (A5)
with i ranging over all items preceding item j.
Entry Into WM
Within the model, entry into WM is a stochastic process. The
likelihood that item j enters WM is a function of the product of the
sensory activity generated by the item over the course of
the stream (aj,t, which is, in turn, a function of all prior attention;
see Equation A1), of the new attention generated by the current
item (fj,t; see Equation A4), and of the likelihood that there is space
in WM (i.e., that all available slots have not yet been occupied by
preceding items):
p(j in WM)  1 
1
1  cWMt fj,taj,t r p(q C). (A6)
The first part of Equation A6 is a squashing function that keeps the
likelihood of entry into WM between 0 and 1. Scaling constant
cWM is set to 15, threshold constant r to 1. Negative values within
the [ ] brackets are set to 0. This means that if the sum of sensory
activity multiplied by attention generated by item j is lower than r,
then j has 0 likelihood of entering WM. P(q  C) is the likelihood
that the number of items already in WM, q, is lower than the
capacity of WM, C. This is calculated by computing the likelihood
that of the previous items in the stream, C have already entered
WM. Capacity C was set to 5, which is within the range of 4 to 7
found by others (Cowan, 2001; G. A. Miller, 1956).
Simulated performance on targets is equal to the likelihood that
these have entered WM at the end of the stream—p(j in WM) (see
Equation A6)—multiplied by .95 to allow for 5% nonspecific
errors (e.g., eye blinks, general lapses of attention, wrong key
presses), plus a guessing correction depending on the number of
response alternatives (n) in the stream:
p(correct) 0.95 p(j in WM) 1/n[1 0.95p(j in WM)]. (A7)
Switching Tasks and Locations
Many RSVP tasks involve switches, in which the targets are
defined differently halfway through the stream (task switch) or are
presented at a different location (location switch). We model such
switches as stochastic. If item i is a cue to switch, the switch can
occur during presentation of any subsequent item. The likelihood
that this has occurred before an item j following i, pswitch,j, follows
a logistic distribution:
pswitch,t 
1
1  e(ton, j  ton,i  	)/
. (A8)
Here, ton,i is the onset time of the cue item, and ton,j is the onset
time of item j. In the case of a task switch, item j is defined as
target or distractor following the new task with likelihood pswitch,j,
and following the old task with likelihood 1 pswitch,j. In the case
of a location switch, item j is processed with likelihood pswitch,j,
whereas only a blank is processed with likelihood 1  pswitch,j.
Parameter 	, the mean of the distribution, is equal to 200 ms for
endogenous task and locations switches and to 75 ms for exoge-
nous cues (salient cues that automatically attract attention to their
location). Parameter 
, which determines the variance, was always
equal to 0.2	.
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